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BEING INCOMMENSURABLE/INCOMMENSURABLE BEINGS: GHOSTS IN
ELIZABETH BOWEN’S SHORT STORIES
by
JEANNETTE WARD SMITH
Under the Direction of Dr. Marilynn Richtarik
ABSTRACT

I investigate the ghosts in Elizabeth Bowen’s short stories, “Green Holly” and “The Happy
Autumn Fields.” By blending psychoanalytic feminism and social feminism, I argue that these
female ghosts are the incommensurable feminine—a feminine that exceeds the bounds of
phallocentric logic and cannot be defined by her social or symbolic manifestations.
An analysis of Bowen’s ghosts as actual ghosts is uncharted territory. Previous Bowen
critics postulate that Bowen’s ghosts are imaginary figments or metaphors. These critics make
Bowen’s stories “truthful” representations of the world, but, as such, Bowen’s ghosts become
representations of the world’s phallocentric order.
In contrast, I argue that these stories adopt a mestiza consciousness. Gloria Anzaldùa
postulates that through a subaltern perspective developed outside of western logic, the mestiza
reclaims the supernatural that exists outside of the masculine, symbolic order. The female ghosts
are the feminine that Luce Irigaray explains, “remain[s] elsewhere” (76) as they live
incommensurably in an alternate supernatural realm, disrupting phallic logic.
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HJHJ
“It is the haunted who haunt.”
“I am not placed: I do not qualify.”
—Elizabeth Bowen

HJHJ

1
Introduction
This project is about subjectivity or, more important, a lack thereof. And it takes its cue
from the perspectives of those who would benefit most from a complete loss of subjectivity—
othered women. An “othered” woman is someone who has very little to gain from the
construction of her subjectivity because she is not the proper gender, ethnicity, sexuality, race,
class, or a combination thereof. Her position in the world of differing subjectivities is less than
others. Her body matters less than others. Hers is a subjectivity of the grotesque. As Mary Russo
explains in The Female Grotesque, “Subjectivity in the West requires the image of the grotesque
body” (9). According to Russo, the “grotesque emerges [. . .] as a deviation from the norm” (11).
The grotesque woman has two options: she can attempt to fashion a subject-position that will
afford her more power of place, or she can look for an opportunity to destroy the mechanics of
her oppression by destroying subjectivity altogether, thus losing herself completely. My project
will explore this second option because the complete loss of subjectivity would provide not only
better options for this woman, but better options for all men, women and others who in some
way or another could benefit from a loss of subjectivity. I will explore this loss of subjectivity in
the short stories of an othered woman, Elizabeth Bowen. An Anglo-Irish writer, Elizabeth
Bowen certainly does not appear at first glance to be othered. Born in 1899 to an upper-middle
class family, she had the class, skin color, and religion of the “normal” woman. But, as Russo
explains, the grotesque is not always something one is born with, like a physical deformity.
Women can slip into and out of the category of the grotesque, and the threat of being grotesque
is a danger that haunts all women. Bowen understood the tenuous nature of subjectivity and the
possibility of slipping into the grotesque because she was Anglo-Irish, making her different,
“othered,” and homeless in both Ireland and England. Bowen’s family was plagued by mental
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disease. Even among their Anglo-Irish peers, the Bowens were known as the crazy ones, the
hysterics. And “she was a married woman who had several lesbian affairs” (Jay xvi). This double
stigma of lesbian infidelity would certainly be considered a grotesque characteristic in Bowen’s
day. Elizabeth Bowen knew well the threat of the grotesque, and this insight, this “othered”
perspective, gave her the ability to see the expansive, positive possibilities inherent in the loss of
the subject. In two of her most radical short stories, “Green Holly” and “The Happy Autumn
Fields,” Elizabeth Bowen wrote about two women who, in becoming ghosts, destroyed the
subject and escaped its oppressive bounds. When viewed through the dual lenses of symbolic
feminism and social feminism, the female ghosts in “Green Holly” and “The Happy Autumn
Fields” escape the oppressive bounds of subjectivity because they exist as the incommensurable
feminine, pursuing an autonomous feminine path and destroying the truth of subjectivity in their
spectral travels.

Incommensurable Feminine
The incommensurable feminine is a concept that springs from feminist psychoanalytic
theorist Luce Irigaray’s concept of feminine difference. In Speculum of the Other Woman,
Irigaray writes that “any theory of the ‘subject’ has always been appropriated by the
‘masculine’” (133), and in This Sex Which Is Not One she reiterates that “within discourse, the
feminine finds itself defined as lack, deficiency, or as imitation and negative image of the
subject” (78). This particular position is not unique, as countless feminists, most notably Simone
de Beauvoir, have posited a similar idea, arguing in one way or another that the male holds the
primary subject position and the female exists only in reference to the male as less than male, the
inverse of male, property of the male, or simply as not male. What is unique about Irigaray’s
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argument is the important stand she takes by arguing for “double mimesis,” which recognizes the
role the feminine performs within the masculine economy and simultaneously posits the radical,
autonomous existence of the feminine outside of that masculine economy. In a frequently
anthologized essay, “This Essentialism Which is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray,”
Naomi Schor compares Beauvoir and Irigaray to elucidate the critical importance of Irigaray’s
take on feminine difference. Schor explains that Beauvoir believes that woman defined in
deference to man “involves attributing to the objectified other a difference that serves to
legitimate her oppression” [emphasis mine] (65). Elizabeth Grosz explains in her critical
summary of Irigaray’s work that, in contrast, Irigaray views this relationship between the male
subject and the female other as really “a relation of contrariety, not contradiction” [emphasis
mine] (106). To reflect this contrariety, many feminists have represented this relationship as A/A, which Marilyn Frye explains may appear dual at first glance but is really a monistic system
and a monistic subjectivity (999). Irigaray calls this A/-A relationship “saming,” and she argues
that it is highly problematic because it “denies the objectified other the right to her difference,
submitting the other to the laws of phallic specularity” (Schor 65).
Beauvoir would solve her problem of difference, as many feminists who followed in her
footsteps have, by advocating that woman be defined as equal to, or the same as, man. In direct
opposition, Irigaray shuns this goal, arguing that the feminine holds worth on its own terms and
deserves its own space of recognition and representation outside of the masculine economy and
its laws of phallic specularity. For Irigaray there is value in being a woman, and women should
keep their difference.
I respond with a visceral affirmation to this claim because I believe strongly that there is
value in feminine difference and other kinds of difference, including race, class, sexuality, and so
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on. But how can that difference be articulated in terms that do not rely on dichotomous logic and
language, which is akin to saming? Despite these problems inherent in articulation, one has to
provide some road map (forgive the linear metaphor) for getting there. According to Grosz,
“Irigaray wishes to explore the conditions needed for and the space occupied by a subject
considered as female” (141). Asserting that she is taking up Irigaray’s wish in her essay “The
Necessity of Differences: Constructing a Positive Category of Women,” Frye “displace[s] A/notA dichotomy with a genuine plurality. Let there be two categories, two subjectivities, A:B.
Conceive a positive category that is entered, occupied, animated by females [. . .]. Make that
arrogant A share the universe” (998). Frye understands Irigaray’s goal of feminine difference,
but I do not think she finds a solution that reaches that goal. First, giving the female a positive
subjectivity that is different in relation to the male keeps intact the system of difference. In A:B,
B is what it is because it is not A and vice versa. This scenario maintains the relational system of
difference, rather than giving the feminine her incommensurable existence. Relational difference
always means that A or B is “better” than or more valued than the other. Second, the A:B
resolution assumes that B—the female—is a homogenous category (or that A—the male—is a
homogenous category, for that matter), which can be represented with one sign and within one
universal group. Frye’s articulation makes room for only two subject categories that assume that
male and female are universally represented in the same way across race, class, ethnic, national,
and sexual difference.
To be fair, Frye claims that her “B” is a system of difference within difference. Her
example is the “Redheads’ Club.” She argues that it is a club “not because all the individuals
who are members of it have red hair,” but “because individuals are involved, in various ways, in
a structure” (1001). Frye is wrong, though, about structure as the defining feature of the club.
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Structure may be a critical part of the club, but the club exists because of the similarity of those
with red hair, which is defined against those who do not have red hair. This club, and like Frye’s
A:B system, is a system that depends on homogeneity and exclusion. And, as Russo explains,
this is also how the system works to define the grotesque. She writes, “The grotesque is only
recognizable in relation to a norm” (10). So setting B and A as two norms creates the
homogeneity and exclusion necessary for grotesque others to be marked as such in relation to A
and B. Thus, Frye’s A:B system is really a system of A:B:C:D:E:F and so on. These other
subjects may also get to share the universe along with A, but, no matter how many subjects claim
subjectivity, the universe and its system of subjectivity will be kept in place. Some subjects will
be better than others; some subjects will be the grotesque. The phallocentric system that subjects
all will maintain its dominance over all. In Frye’s example, the female gains her differing
subjectivity, but that leaves the system of subjectivity in place.
The phallocentric universe should not be kept. It will only maintain the system that
subjects one to another, bestows more value to one than another, and creates those who are
normal and those who are othered as the grotesque. Irigaray’s ultimate and radical goal was to
dismantle the system, not to spread even wider the net of subjectivity to capture larger groups. In
This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray writes, “The issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of
which woman would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical machinery itself,
of suspending its pretension to the production of truth” (78). If it is now clear that developing
alternate subjects is not the path to feminine difference, then what is? Irigaray vehemently argues
that the feminine “remain[s] elsewhere” (76). In her essay, “Against Proper Objects,” Judith
Butler defines Irigaray’s feminine: “Irigaray [. . .] maintains that the feminine is necessarily
redoubled, that it exists first as a signifier within a masculinist economy, but then it ‘exists’
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outside of that economy (where nothing may exist) [. . .]” (18). Along similar lines, Frye comes
the closest to articulating Irigaray’s incommensurable feminine when she postulates that what is
outside of A is undifferentiated. In her example, A= vanilla; thus, Frye says, chocolate,
strawberry, Halley’s comet, and all shoes in the world are not-vanilla (999). But, she argues, “So
far as the category of vanilla is concerned, the category of not-vanilla is an infinite
undifferentiated plenum, unstructured, formless, a chaos undelineated by any internal
boundaries” (999). Eureka! This is certainly the idea of a feminine that jams the machinery. The
feminine must be left outside of A. She must be left outside of subjectivity, so that she can
remain unstructured, formless, chaotic—so that she can “exist” where “nothing may exist.”
Butler explains that Irigaray “insists on the radical incommensurability of the feminine with any
of its given articulations” (18). This is Irigaray’s feminine “double mimesis,” which posits the
radical, autonomous existence of the feminine outside of that masculine economy in an
incommensurable form. In other words, while the female is rendered discursively, symbolically,
and socially as the lesser referent to the male, Irigaray posits that she also has a transgressive,
autonomous existence outside of the masculine linguistic order. The feminine that is truly
different is incommensurable with any other terms. She does not refer to, share a universe with,
or speak the same language as any other term, sign, or subject.
To destroy the inequity of the system truly, the system must be dismantled and rendered
baseless. The system rationalizes and naturalizes truths based on what can be articulated. What
can be known through language and articulated through words comprises the entirety of what is
accepted as real and natural. If the unnatural violates the natural by crossing into its marked
territory, while remaining unnatural, if the unreal makes its presence known in the world of the

7
real and maintains its unreality, then the system loses its hold on truth and, to borrow from Karl
Marx, what is solid melts into air.

Dealing with ghosts
What does not share our universe? What exists where nothing can exist? What could be
called formless chaos? The answer: ghosts. In 1994, Derrida wrote, “There has never been a
scholar, who really as a scholar, deals with ghosts. A traditional scholar does not believe in
ghosts—nor in all that can be called the virtual space of spectrality” (11). I believe in ghosts. I
will deal with ghosts in order to articulate the incommensurable feminine. I will deal with ghosts
as a scholar, and to do so I must abandon a scholar’s logic. The nonsense and unreality of ghosts
are the shifting sands upon which my argument will be built. Sound impossible? That is exactly
the point. The rational logic of this world will not help me explore the world of ghosts. Derrida
explains, “There has never been a scholar who, as such, does not believe in the sharp distinction
between the real and the unreal, the actual and the inactual, the living and the non-living, being
and non-being [. . .](11). Today, I am that scholar. I take my cues from Irigaray, who wrote in
2002 that “you can become and remain a mystery that illuminates me with a light different from
the light of reason” (84). I argue that ghosts emit a light different from the light of reason. And I
will attempt to analyze them (and thus articulate them) in such a way that they become and
remain a mystery. And I am founding my project upon the assumption that ghosts are not a myth
or a theoretical idea, but as “real” as all other articulatable concepts. Thus, I will analyze ghosts
as worthy of critical study. The goal of my project is to reveal the artificial boundary between the
real and unreal, being and non-being, in order to break down the “truth” of subjectivity. I argue
that a true exploration of ghosts will reveal radically expansive possibilities that lay to waste the
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boundaries of truth and subjectivity. To do this, I will use the ghost stories of Elizabeth Bowen
as my haunting grounds.
Bowen is best known for her novels, but she is acclaimed for her short stories. She wrote
eight short stories that include ghosts. I have chosen “Green Holly” and “The Happy Autumn
Fields” to analyze because these two stories provide the best opportunity to focus a lengthy
analysis on ghosts, as a ghost is the primary character in each story. These stories feature
speaking, thinking, and acting female ghosts who clearly break the boundaries between the real
and the unreal and tear at the limits of the subject by embodying the incommensurable feminine.
Butler explains that the incommensurable feminine “marks that limit of representability which
would undo the presuppositions of representation itself” (19). The distinction between the real
and unreal, being and non-being, must be blurred and—if one is lucky—erased in order to
achieve radical, expansive opportunities for losing the subject.
Perhaps in response to Derrida’s plea, other critics have located their critical studies in or
near the realm of ghosts. One of the earliest studies was done by a literary scholar, Daniel
Cottom. In his 1991 book Abyss of Reason: Cultural Movement, Revolutions and Betrayals,
Cottom explores the relationship between nineteenth-century spiritualism and twentieth-century
surrealism. Cottom studies the movements and the people who shaped these movements in order
to “show how a confrontation with the monsters and abysses of reason may lead us to discover
other, more satisfying worlds in that which we call the world” (21). To Cottom, ghosts and
spiritualism are important because they threaten language, authorship, ownership, and the ability
for anyone to interpret or analyze any linguistic text “truthfully” and absolutely. Cottom posits
that spiritual mediums were controversial in the nineteenth century because they “expose[d]
language, behavior, character, individual persons, and the entirety of culture as unfounded
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representations” (56). Cottom helps start the discussion around ghosts’ ability to threaten the
primacy of truth. As well, Cottom’s idea that ghosts threaten ownership ties directly with
Irigaray’s belief, as I will discuss later, that ownership is a mark of the masculinist economy, and
the inability to own a mark of the feminine.
Helen Sword builds much of her book Ghostwriting Modernism upon arguments made by
Cottom. One of the longest of the ghostly critical analyses, Sword’s book explores popular
spiritualism, the practice where the dead communicate with the living via a human medium, a
practice that was a popular fad between 1848 to the mid-twentieth century, to show how
modernist writers “steeped in ironic sensibility and material aesthetics” used spiritualism to
explore paradox, fluidity, and a self-contradictory ideological space (9). While Sword makes
many valuable points about spiritualism and modernism, a survey of her book reveals that Sword
is not analyzing the spirits who inhabit the living, but the effects that this spiritual practice had
on writers and their works. She argues that the writers who incorporated spiritualism into their
work broke boundaries and explored uncharted territory, but the actual practice of spiritualism
itself, or the ghosts the practice dredged up, are not of nearly as much concern to her.
Despite her disappointing lack of focus on spirits, Sword does pose a few significant
questions. Sword asks, “How can we account for the striking persistence of popular spiritualism,
that credulous Victorian fad, in the cynical age of literary modernism?” (x). She hypothesizes the
answer to be that there are many connections between authorship and mediumship (8). Sword
defines authorship as the claim to author literature, and argues that writers felt threatened by
“spiritualists’ tendency to dwell on the inherent fragility and mendacity of language, laying bare,
in effect, the tricks of the writer’s trade” (8). Building from Sword’s assertions, I see authorship
as the phallocentric claim to author the world via language. I argue that to expose language and
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logic and, ultimately, depose them from their reign of truth, a ghost must lay bare the “trick” that
established the logic of the phallocentric world. If this solid world of sense can be disrupted by
pseudo-subjects that cross in and out of its boundaries, then the masculinist economy does not
hold a monopoly on reality.
In Jean-Michel Rabaté’s The Ghosts of Modernity, another study centered on ghosts,
Rabaté argues that ghosts embody the postmodern aesthetic. Indeed, there are certainly many
similarities. Ghosts are slippery and escape concrete meaning; they are paradoxically neither
present nor absent, yet both present and absent; they defy categorization; they are copies of
copies, simulacra of our world. All in all, ghosts make clever metaphors for the tenets of
postmodernism, and Rabaté extends this metaphor throughout his study. I agree with Rabaté’s
conclusions about the similarities between ghosts and postmodernism. But his analysis is about a
metaphor for postmodernism, not an analysis of ghosts themselves.
I was disappointed to find no other scholarly works on ghosts as ghosts. I was also
disappointed, and surprised, to find that these book-length studies of ghosts, which mostly
reference modern literature and modern writers, do not mention Elizabeth Bowen’s ghost stories.
These analyses focus on other modern writers who wrote about ghosts or haunted subjects, or
who dabbled in or practiced spiritualism, including Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Lewis Carroll,
Emily Dickinson, T. S. Eliot, Rudyard Kipling, Sylvia Plath, Edgar Allen Poe, Walt Whitman,
Virginia Woolf, and W. B. Yeats.
To find analysis of Bowen’s ghost stories, one has to turn to critical analysis focused
solely on Bowen. No critic I found surveys Bowen’s ghost stories together as a singular topic of
study. Thus far, Bowen critics have analyzed her ghost stories in one of two ways. Most
frequently, they mention all of the ghost stories in one brief breath, making a sweeping
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generalization about them on the way to another, seemingly more important, point. Alternatively,
critics isolate one ghost story to focus singly on. I am one of the very few critics who analyze
more than one Bowen ghost story side by side.
As I have mentioned, most previous critics analyze ghosts not as ghosts, but as a conduit
for theoretical metaphor or literary meaning. This is also true of the critics who analyze Bowen’s
ghost stories. In the introduction to the only complete collection of Bowen’s short stories, The
Collected Stories of Elizabeth Bowen, Angus Wilson says that Elizabeth Bowen had an
“apparent total acceptance of ghosts, of the occult” (10). I agree. I believe that Bowen’s complete
acceptance of ghosts and respect for the occult comes through in her ghost stories. Following this
sentence, Wilson spends five more sentences on Bowen’s ghost stories to conclude ultimately
that in Bowen’s ghost stories, “Ghosts make sense of life not nonsense” (10). I am vehemently
opposed to Wilson’s reading. I do not want Bowen’s ghost stories to make sense of life. I want
her stories and the ghosts in them to remain nonsense, if nonsense means an escape from the
masculine economy.
The other critic who analyzes multiple ghost stories at once is John Coates in his essay
“The Moral Argument of Elizabeth Bowen’s Ghost Stories.” Coates explores three Bowen ghost
stories (none of which is “Green Holly” or “The Happy Autumn Fields”) and posits that all
Bowen’s ghost stories are oblique criticisms of the English middle class and its emotional
poverty. He argues that Bowen’s ghosts represent the living characters’ moral dilemmas and
distinguish between the good and bad choices those characters make. Coates makes Bowen’s
ghosts representations of morality and the bad karma of problematic, yet pampered, lives. Thus,
in Coates’s version, the ghosts represent rather than exist.
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In Twentieth-Century Suspense, an anthology of mystery and ghost stories, J. A. Morris
analyzes several of Bowen’s short stories. In his introduction, Morris says that in Bowen’s
stories “what we see hides a disturbing reality that we ignore at our own peril” (115). But, just
when it looks as if a third critic will study a number of Bowen ghost stories at once, Morris says
that this peril is “better seen in stories which ostensibly contain no influence of the supernatural”
(115). He goes on to ignore all of Bowen’s ghost stories but one—“The Demon Lover”—
concluding that Bowen’s suspense stories are an exploration of “what can make us insane” (117).
Like Wilson’s reading, this interpretation returns Bowen’s stories to the real world through an
exploration of the human psyche. Morris ends his essay by saying that “we haunt ourselves”
(128) instead of accepting the real presence of ghosts as an external haunting that cannot be
controlled.
Coates’s conclusion that the ghosts are figments of unstable minds is the most popular
assumption about Bowen’s stories. Robert L. Calder provides several examples of critics who
make that claim regarding “The Demon Lover,” and Wilson suggests that the ghostly possession
in “The Happy Autumn Fields” is not actual possession, but the living woman’s means of
mentally escaping the horrible realities of war (10). Martin Bidney echoes Wilson in his essay,
“Nostalgic Narcissism in Comic and Tragic Perspectives: Elizabeth Bowen’s Two Fictional
Reworkings of a Tennyson Lyric,” where he says that the possessed woman is really dreaming of
another world to satiate her selfish will and idealized picture of the world.
Bowen’s ghosts also appear as allegory in some critics’ works. David Punter argues that
the appearance of ghosts in modernist texts reveals fissures in the modernist project that betray
its ultimate inability to sustain a linear, progressive narrative for the future. To Punter, her ghosts
represent the breakdown of the modernist project. In his essay, “‘A More Sinister Troth’:
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Elizabeth Bowen’s ‘The Demon Lover’ as Allegory,” Calder argues that the ghost in Bowen’s
“The Demon Lover” is an allegory for war and symbolizes the Second World War’s evil
disruption of life and the complicity of society in that disruptive malice.
In Elizabeth Bowen: The Enforced Return, Neil Corcoran analyzes a wide breadth of
Bowen’s work, from nonfiction to novels to short stories, as he focuses on Bowen’s
remembrances and returns. Remembering and returning were strong themes of Bowen’s, and
Corcoran looks at these themes in the short stories published in her The Demon Lover and Other
Stories collection, the collection in which “Green Holly” and “The Happy Autumn Fields” were
originally published. Corcoran plugs these stories into his overall analysis of return by saying
that they “concern that more ultimate form of returnee, the revenant or ghost [. . .]” (148). Of the
ghost stories in The Demon Lover collection, Corcoran focuses on “The Demon Lover” and
“The Happy Autumn Fields.” He posits that these ghost stories are really returns to the past, not
ghosts coming into the present, as I see the ghost in “The Happy Autumn Fields.” Corcoran
argues that the returns manifest the symptoms and effects of war on people in the present.
The textual possibilities offered by these critics are interesting, in some cases viable, and
above all “safer” as they reinsert Bowen’s ghost stories into the logic of the “natural,” “normal”
order. These texts leave ghosts in the realm of the unreal and leave intact the boundaries that
divide the “real” world from the ghostly world. These texts analyze the conditions that birthed
the ghosts, such as a writer’s mediumistic wife or the widespread popularity of an elite pastime;
the implications of ghosts in texts, such as what metaphors can be drawn from ghosts or what
function the ghosts hold in the stories; or what the ghosts tell us about the characters who see
them. These critics make Bowen’s stories easier to believe as “truthful” representations of the
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world, but, as such, Bowen’s ghost stories also become representations of the world’s
phallocentric order.
It seems that any critic, including myself, who analyzes ghosts feels that her or his work
is groundbreaking and unorthodox. What does set my work apart is that all of the criticisms that I
have uncovered analyze the ghosts, mediums, spirits and séances as metaphors, literary tropes,
indications of postmodernism to come, psychological slips that reveal cracks in the modernist
project, or, as Sword does, reflections of writers’ “real-life fascination with the historical
phenomenon of popular spiritualism” (55). I do not use the ghosts as metaphors that lead me to
conclusions about the natural world or the human psyche. I do not want to tell you why ghosts
appeared in modernist works or the effects that these ghosts produced on the texts. I argue that
the really important critical questions concerning Bowen’s ghost stories are: What happens if one
deals with these ghost stories on their own terms as ghost stories? What happens if the ghosts are
not metaphored out of existence, but left as ghosts to defy natural logic? What happens if the
ghosts are real? I will abandon previous critics’ belittling moves of ghostly metaphor and
hysteric imagination and deal with the ghosts as ghosts. At the heart of my argument is my
acceptance of the ghosts as real. And, as a result, I analyze the ghosts, not their causes or effects.
I will use a feminist lens and the mestiza consciousness to show that the female ghosts in “Green
Holly” and “The Happy Autumn Fields” remain ghosts and reveal the radical, incommensurable
feminine.
How can I argue that ghosts are real? The idea that ghosts are real, and thus my thesis
that rests on this idea, presents a few problems and raises many questions certainly. What makes
a ghost real? Does seeing a ghost make it real? Does touching a ghost make it real? Certainly
speaking about a ghost does not make it real; since language, as theorized by Jacques Lacan, is
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the presence of an absence, language separates us from all things. So how do I plan to deal with
ghosts? I have located my thesis within three differing theoretical perspectives—the theories of
Gloria Anzaldùa, Irigaray and Lacan. All three of these theorists’ insights are necessary to reach
a place where ghosts can be real and phallocentric logic can be escaped. And if nothing in the
symbolic realm can be considered real or concrete or imbued with any truth, and thus no
argument can be made about reality, truth and nature, how can I argue that ghosts are real? I
argue that it is important to consider ghosts to be as real as anything else. I put them on a level
playing field with all other “real” things. Ghosts are as real as elephants, as real as automobiles,
as real as dinosaurs. The logic of science—evolution, genealogy and paleontology—“proves”
that dinosaurs existed. Archeology has “proven” what they looked like and where and when they
lived. Museums display their bones and tell their “history.” Are dinosaurs real? Whether real or
not, academia assumes that they are a legitimate field of study. Ghosts are just as “real” as
dinosaurs and, thus, a legitimate field of study. Ghosts have “scientists” who study them. Women
and men who believe in ghosts and spirits tell their history via ghost stories, and they
disseminate these stories to others. One does not have to see a ghost to believe that they exist. I
argue that they are as real as anything else can be real and that any opposition to their truth is an
opposition that puts a singular value on the truths of Western logic. In the term coined by
Anzaldùa, I have adopted a mestiza consciousness that does not dismiss the non-logic of the
subjugated other. I have chosen Anzaldùa because she maintains that the spirit world is a valid
locus for originating “truth.” To her, and other ethnic and racial minorities, what is true and
logical is not something that has to be mapped and proven. It can be felt and believed.
The idea that nothing is real, that language separates us from all things, is the first layer
of difficulty that I have to work through. The second layer is the fact that I am analyzing ghosts
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that appear in fictional stories, not in eye-witness accounts or historical narrative. However, I see
Bowen’s short stories as microcosms of the “real” world and imbued with the influences of the
socio-historical contexts from which they arose. How the ghosts interact in Bowen’s text is
illustrative of ghost’s function in the grand text of the “real” world. In fact, the realm of fiction
and storytelling presents the best space to purport the nonsensical and illogical, because it is a
fictionalized space, a space that does not have to adhere to the logic of “truth.” I plan to differ
from critics who have taken Bowen’s fictionalized space and returned it to the realm of logic by
arguing away the ghosts or inserting them into a teleological metaphor.
Finally, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to argue for the concrete reality of anything via
the incomplete system of language. But that is the point. First, I am not looking for concrete
reality. I am looking for a reality that exists outside of the concrete. I seek a reality that ebbs and
flows and does not hold its shape, a reality of chaos, a reality of nonsense. That is a reality that
more closely aligns with Irigaray’s incommensurable feminine. That is a reality outside of
phallic logic. Second, I am looking for a reality outside of language, a reality that has not yet
been co-opted by words, by those linguistic symbols that attempt to possess, define and own
meaning. Like Cottom and Sword, I argue that ghosts exploit the incompleteness of language
with their flagrant disregard for wholeness and the concrete. Ghosts manage to exist outside of
phallic logic, while at the same time they are able to disrupt phallic reality by appearing within
the “real” world. In “Exceeding Hegel and Lacan: Differing Fields of Pleasure in Foucualt and
Irigaray,” Shannon Winnubst writes that “language is weaving always through the field of
phallic pleasure and desire—erecting new concepts that are then enveloped by the Oedipal
mother of discourse” (13). She is concerned with finding a way to speak the feminine—a
difficult task, she admits, when the very act of speaking is rife with these problematics.
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I recognize the same problems that Winnubst identifies. I plan to speak about ghosts even
when speaking makes them less real and more absent. I plan to speak about ghosts, hopefully, in
a way that avoids their envelopment into the “Oedipal mother of discourse.” I plan to speak
about ghosts in terms that abandon this insistence on a singular reality and a singular truth as
defined by Western modes of understanding the world’s order. Winnubst terms the “phallic
field” traditional Western metaphysics. I am locating my argument both within and outside of
Western metaphysics. Lacan provided Irigaray with a way to explore the place where the
feminine was hidden in her incommensurable form. I am using Irigaray, Lacan and Anzaldùa to
find the incommensurable feminine as ghosts in an othered spirit world. The ghosts are not a
metaphor for the incommensurable feminine. The ghosts are not a conduit for making meaning.
The ghosts are the incommensurable feminine. My goal is to show how we can see the
incommensurable feminine and believe in her reality. This requires putting value back into “to
be” and finding a place where what is “real” does not require phallic teleology.

Seeing the ghosts. Seeing the incommensurable feminine.
What does it take for one to see ghosts as ghosts? What does it take for one to reach the
incommensurable feminine? In Specters of Marx, Derrida articulates the difficulty scholars have
faced when confronted with ghosts. In “Against Proper Objects,” Butler expresses her concern
over the difficulty of finding and articulating the incommensurable feminine. If both ghosts and
the incommensurable feminine are hard to get to, how will I reach both together? Butler provides
the answer in “Against Proper Objects.” In her essay, she poses the following critical question
about the incommensurable feminine: “In what manner of double-speak must the feminine
proceed when it is understood as the unrepresentable in its paradoxical effort to represent itself?”
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(19). She suggests that collapsing the barriers that divide two of the most prominent feminist
theoretical perspectives will make it possible to represent this unrepresentable. Butler seeks to
combine social feminism, which focuses on the sociological construction of gender, and
symbolic feminism, which focuses on the symbolic encoding of sex difference into the subject,
into one hybrid approach. I argue that the blending of these two theories, the melding of their
seemingly dissonant parts, creates theoretical probabilities never before realized in the
actualization of the incommensurable feminine. Social feminism and symbolic feminism will
have to work together, despite their antithetical differences. The incommensurable feminine is a
feminine that transforms the symbolic under pressure from the social. When these two worlds
collide, she appears at the crossroads—in the gap previously thought to be barren—in no man’s
land.

Social feminism
Social feminism is defined by two critical elements that make it extremely relevant to the
future of feminism and the exploration of a revolutionized subjectivity. The first element is that
the subject is constructed by more than gender or sex. Social feminism insists that the
feminine—and what it means to be female—manifests itself in hundreds of varied ways, all of
which prove that there is no universal or defining “truth” that can be posited about what
constitutes gender, female or male. To social feminists, gender is a constructed category that is
influenced by the “relations of power that help to constitute yet exceed gender” (Butler 17),
including class, race, geopolitical positionality, sexuality, colonialism, and other determinants of
a subject’s place within socio-historical contexts. Social feminism posits that the subject is
constructed within and by this network. The determinants themselves are a construction, a
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complex network of discursive ideologies that spins the subject within its web. Michel Foucault
explains that the differences between subjects are the strategy of “individualization,” which
makes “it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties and to render the
differences useful by fitting them into one another” (184). Identities are knowable, not by
themselves, but because of their difference from and relation to other identities. The subject is
constructed through an intricate and complexly webbed intersection of ideologies that
individualize by making every being a useful subject. While Frye posits A:B as a plausible
scenario for feminine difference, social feminism makes it clear that A and B can be an A and a
B because they exclude others who are different. And the differences of the others are intricate,
layered, complex and never-ending.
The second element of social feminism is that no subject is locked into the “truth” of its
present subjectivity. Subjects can move between ideologies and adopt different stances and
subject-positions. Pressure from groups and individuals can change discourse as well, thus
changing the structure of the subject and the lives of real people. Because discourse shifts shape
and changes over time, the subject’s shape can be altered through the transformation of
discourse.
Not surprisingly, within the feminist camp that embraces multiplicity, there is a multitude
of social feminisms. One school of social feminism in particular provides the lens for seeing
ghosts—the feminism of the borderlands. Social feminist Anzaldùa posits borderland feminism
in Borderlands/La Frontera, her inter-disciplinary book of cultural theory, poetry, and
anthropology. In this work, Anzaldùa establishes an evolved, hybrid frame of reference for
reconstructing subjectivity. Her borderland feminism privileges a mestiza consciousness. The
mestiza grapples with what it means to be a subject comprised of multiple and, oftentimes,

20
conflicting ethnic and national positions. Anzaldùa argues that the influence of these conflicting,
multiple apparati of power creates a hybrid consciousness. She writes, “From this racial,
ideological, and biological cross-pollination, an ‘alien’ consciousness is presently in the making
– a new mestiza consciousness” (77). The mestiza is characterized by “psychic restlessness” (78);
“she can’t hold concepts in rigid boundaries” (78); her flexibility allows her “to stretch the
psyche horizontally and vertically” (79). Stretching the psyche beyond its limits means pushing
in reverse out of the ordered consciousness into the chaotic unconscious.
Thus, the mestiza consciousness provides an opportunity to escape the masculine economy.
Anzaldùa writes, “That juncture where the mestiza stands is where phenomena tend to collide”
(34). The mestiza’s constantly colliding phenomena eventually tear phallocentric logic, and the
mestiza embraces the supernatural order that stands outside the order of the masculine symbolic.
The mestiza embraces the reclamation of a supernatural world that was once readily sensed and
respected by the subaltern subject and, Anzaldùa argues, should be (re)sensed by the subjugated
unconscious. Of herself, Anzaldùa says, “Like many Indians and Mexicans, [. . .] I allowed white
rationality to tell me that the existence of the ‘other world’ was mere pagan superstition. I
accepted their reality, the ‘official’ reality of the rational, reasoning mode” (36-7). After
embracing the mestiza consciousness, Anzaldùa writes, “No matter to what use my people put
the supernatural world, it is evident to me now that the spirit world [. . .] does in fact exist” (38).
La facultad, the mestiza’s ability to see ghosts, requires her to accept ghosts existence as truth.
By embracing the ethnically subjugated consciousness, la facultad provides the mestiza with a
truthful otherworld that exists outside of the patriarchal symbolic order.

Psychoanalytic feminism

21
Psychoanalytic feminism is founded on Freud and Lacan’s psychoanalytic theories about
the formation of the subject. Freud postulated that the infant is not born a human subject; it
becomes one through a universal socialization process termed the Oedipus complex. For the first
six to eight months of its life, the human infant cannot distinguish between its own body and its
mother’s—it cannot tell where it ends and she begins. The mother fully satiates it. However,
eventually the mother leaves the child, and the child experiences its first pangs of desire. It
cannot possess what it wants. The child blames this separation from the mother on the father.
The child wants to destroy the father until it realizes that the source of the father’s power over
the mother is the penis, an organ that its father possesses and its mother lacks. The boy-child,
still desiring to possess the mother, enters into full human subjectivity when he diverts his desire
for the mother into a desire for other women. In doing this, he realizes that he must protect his
penis from castration, because his penis gives him the power to possess women and, he hopes,
satiate his desire. The desire of the girl-child for the mother is converted into the desire for the
father who possesses the penis. In her attempt to satiate her desire, the girl-child settles for
possession of the penis by way of future penetration by a man who acts as substitute for the
father.
Lacan extended Freud’s psychoanalytic theories by adding language to this process. For
Lacan, the Oedipus complex was played out through linguistic symbolism. The infant enters the
symbolic order (enters language) simultaneously with its entrance into the Oedipus complex.
Anika Lemaire’s book-length critical study of psychoanalytic theory summarizes Lacan’s
theories and the theories of many other psychoanalytic critics who share Lacan’s views about the
subject. Explaining how language forms the subject, Lemaire writes, “The form of language is
not a mechanical form imposed upon the subject from the outside, but an organic form like an
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innate seed which develops from the inside” (28). Lacan argues that the subject’s genesis in
language parallels the Oedipus complex. For the first six to eight months of its life, the infant
lives in a primitive state, akin to the unconscious, where there are no words for things or
distinctions between things. Lacan argues that the human infant perceives itself as one with its
mother because it cannot distinguish itself as a body uniquely separate from others. Lacan
considers the “mirror stage” the stage where “the child recuperates the totality of his body in an
image and gradually becomes conscious of himself as an entity” (Lemaire 176). The mirror stage
allows the child to understand the separateness of things, a necessary precondition for
understanding that language will ultimately divide all things from other things, as well as divide
(or “murder” as Lemaire calls it) physical entities (like a small, furry animal) from the words that
act as their substitutes (like “cat”). And, most important, the mirror stage precedes the
understanding that language will divide the infant into a distinct subject. Lemaire writes, “The
mirror stage is therefore the first precursor of the ‘I’” (177).
Language continues to develop the subject through this process. Of language, Lemaire
writes, “The symbolic order of language is an order of interdependent signs bound together by
specific laws” (Lemaire 6). Lemaire explains that “In Oedipus, the father plays the role of the
symbolic law which establishes the family triangle by actualizing in his person the prohibition of
union with the mother” (7). It is the “father’s speech forbidding the child its mother in the
Oedipus [that] puts the child in its position to divert its desire on to something else by accepting
the law” (Lemaire 164). Lacan argues that the Law of the Father and The Law of the Phallus are
the same law. When the child rejects the mother, Lacan argues that it does so because it
recognizes that the mother lacks the phallus. The phallus is Freud’s “penis” within the symbolic
order of language. When linguistic theories are applied to the Oedipus, the penis is no longer a
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real object, but the concept of a real object represented by a linguistic substitute and raised to the
level of myth. The phallus “takes on the symbolic meaning of absence of lack” (Lemaire 59).
The child desires to possess the phallus because it represents the absence of lack. And, while
neither the mother nor the father possesses the phallus, the father “has a penis, an organ which
has been elected to the function of a ‘phallic’ symbol of non-lack and which consequently
engenders the conflicting forms of the male and female castration complexes” (Lemaire 59). The
male subject is formed by identifying with the father, so that he may not lose his penis—the
phallus stand-in. The female subject is formed by diverting her desire for possessing a phallus
for herself into a desire to be penetrated by the phallus stand-in.
Feminist psychoanalytic theorists who work seriously with the theories of Lacan and Freud
do take issue with these men’s assumptions about the formation of the female subject. It certainly
can be argued that many girls and boys do not assume their gendered subject positions this way.
What makes Freud’s and Lacan’s theories valuable is the way that they explicitly express the
underlying assumptions, prejudices and oppressions that are built into language, culture, and the
polis. As Grosz explains, “psychoanalytic theory can itself be read as a symptom of a broader,
underlying cultural and intellectual misogyny” (105). Psychoanalytic theory reveals two critical
suppositions of Western culture: first, that the subject is not born a subject, but is formed by a
linguistic process that creates a subject; and second, that “masculine and feminine are established
in language prior to any given social articulation” (Butler 18). What makes these two
suppositions problematic is that within the linguistic process the phallus is the ultimate signifier.
And the primacy of the male and the feminine’s secondary status are eternally fixed. Lemaire
writes, “The young child’s entry into the symbolic order will fashion him in accordance with the
structures proper to that order: The subject will be fashioned by the Oedipus and by the
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structures of language” (6). Grosz writes, “Phallocentrism is the use of one model of subjectivity,
the male, by which all others are positively or negatively defined” (101). Thus, the subject is
constructed by a masculinist linguistic system that orders the subject according to
phallogocentrism.

The difference that Irigaray makes
Irigaray uses the discourse of psychoanalysis to undo its own phallocentrism and create a
space for the radical feminine. As Grosz explains, “Irigaray uses psychoanalysis without being
committed to its fundamental presuppositions” (104). For Irigaray, Freud’s and Lacan’s systems
“institute a phallic economy, an economy based on sameness, oneness or identity with the
masculine subject—an ‘a priori of the same.’ [Freud and Lacan’s] position, in short, is
phallocentric” (Grosz 105). For the sake of the feminine, Irigaray seeks to escape the symbolic
order of the subject. Butler explains, “When Irigaray insists that the feminine exists elsewhere,
she is marking out a space for the feminine that exceeds and defies any of its given articulations.
This becomes a necessity on the presumption that the existing field of articulability is governed
and strained by phallogocentrism” (Butler 18).
Lacan and Freud identify a crack in the phallocentric order and call it the unconscious.
Lemaire writes, “[. . .] we can say with Lacan that the appearance of language is simultaneous
with the primal repression which constitutes the unconscious” (53). The unconscious is thus the
result of a primal repression. It is what is subdued and repressed when language forms the
subject. Irigaray takes advantage of the unconscious as “primal repression” and uses it to tease
out a space for the incommensurable feminine. Grosz explains that
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Irigaray suggests a close resemblance between the unconscious in its relation to
consciousness and women in relation to patriarchy [. . .] it is possible to regard women
not as having an unconscious but as being it [. . .] the threat the unconscious poses to
civilisation in its symptomatic return. (106-7)
Irigaray finds the existence of the incommensurable feminine within the psychoanalytic notion of
the unconscious. Coupling the unconscious with Lacan’s notion of the symbolic, Irigaray teases
out a space for the feminine that falls into the undefined, unregulated space of the unconscious
and the real—a space that not only escapes language and the teleological ordering of the world,
but also disrupts the phallocentric order of the symbolic. Irigaray does not wish for this feminine
to be a subject equal to or the same as man. Because language orders the feminine’s subjugation
prior to subject formation, phall-logos makes it impossible for the feminine to overcome this
subjugation within the phallocentric economy. Irigaray does not wish to work within the bounds
of this economy to find an alternate articulation for the feminine. Irigaray’s feminine is
incommensurable, “capable of representation and recognition in its own defined terms” (Grosz
101). As Butler explains, Irigaray’s redoubled feminine exists both within the masculine
economy and outside that economy, “where nothing may exist” (18).
Unfortunately, Irigaray does not leave instructions for unlocking the door to her radical
otherworld where the feminine lives. Many feminists who have followed Irigaray grapple with
finding the keys to free the feminine from her symbolic prison. How does one get beyond the
masculine economy to access the incommensurable feminine? In “Against Proper Objects,”
Butler points toward the answer by calling for the fusing of symbolic feminism and social
feminism. But, as Butler concedes, combining these perspectives is not a simple task. This
combination requires a radical re-conception of language, the symbolic realm, and the given
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social order. As she thinks through the challenges of her proposed hybrid feminism, Butler asks,
“how ought the relation between the social and the symbolic to be reconfigured? [. . .] and how
might ideality (possibility, transformability) be reintroduced into feminist accounts of the
social?” (79-80). I argue that fusing these vital elements of social and psychoanalytic feminism
into one transformative feminist theory unlocks the door to the incommensurable feminine. This
radical incommensurability is important because it carves out a space for the feminine that is not
subject to any laws, whether social or symbolic, by radically rethinking psychoanalytic notions
of the unconscious and language. The feminine exists on her own terms and her terms alone.

Seeing ghosts requires double vision
The trouble with social and psychoanalytic feminisms, both critically important feminist
perspectives, is that they oppose each other in fundamental ways. However, their oppositional
stances, when brought together, make it possible for real ghosts to light the way to the
incommensurable feminine. For social feminists, the subject cannot be considered solely a
product of sex difference. The subject is constructed through a much more complex network of
determinants, each determinant affecting the subject’s shape. Psychoanalytic feminists take issue
with exactly this notion of sex sharing the driver’s seat with other determinants. They see this as
downplaying sex difference into “gender,” a less relevant category. As Butler writes,
Gender presupposes a notion of cultural construction in which the subject is taken as a
given, and gender then requires a supplementary meaning or role. Some would argue that
such a view can recognize neither the way in which the workings of sexual difference in
language establish the subject nor the masculinity of that subject—and the exclusion of
the feminine from subject formation that that subject requires. (16)

27
Social feminism’s notion of gender becomes increasingly problematic because, as Bulter posits,
social feminism can “misidentify the construction of the feminine within a masculinist economy
with the feminine itself” (Butler 18). This is an unfortunate conflation because then the limits of,
the totality of, the feminine’s life—her only life—is what is prescribed to her in the social realm,
with all of its repression and oppression.
If the feminine can only exist within the social order, then she cannot exist
incommensurably elsewhere. She is trapped within the repressive and oppressive boundaries of
the masculinist social order. Psychoanalytic feminists theorize a critical gap in the
masculine/feminine dichotomy that refuses to accept the feminine as represented within the
masculine economy as its one and only truth. Summing up Irigaray’s position and the similar
positions of other psychoanalytic feminists, Butler writes, “Whereas some cultural
constructionists might claim that gender is equivalent to its construction, those who work
within—and in a productively critical relation to—the Lacanian frame of sexual difference
would insist on the radical incommensurability of the feminine with any of its given social
articulations” (18). Psychoanalytic feminists construct the door that leads to the
incommensurable feminine, but they lock the door shut with their insistence on linguistic logic.
What social feminists—specifically non-Western social feminists—bring to the table is a
belief in a system of non-logic that is not bound to Lacanian linguistics or teleological project of
progression and sense. Social feminists unlock the door that psychoanalytic feminists have
drawn with the key of non-logic. The non-logic of the mestiza consciousness is the different
economy that Irigaray seeks. Irigaray writes about the feminine’s “symptomatic return” as the
unconscious; ghosts are those returns.
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Through my analysis of Bowen’s stories, I will bring social and symbolic feminism
together. The symbolic will provide the opening necessary to escape the subject because it
assumes that subjectivity is not a given, but something that one takes on through the adoption of
language; and the social gets us on the train that rides through that opening because it says that
language and understanding are not fixed, but varied, fluid, and open to change. On the other
side of the opening, we meet the incommensurable feminine.

Elizabeth Bowen: The ghost lady with cigarettes
Why is Elizabeth Bowen able to capture the incommensurable feminine in her ghosts? I
argue that Bowen’s Anglo-Irish background gave her the ability to see the ghosts, that her
understanding of woman’s place helped transform the ghosts of her Anglo-Irish background into
the incommensurable feminine, and that the Second World War provided the impetus that
brought it all together and helped the incommensurable feminine cross over, breaking the
boundary between the natural and supernatural realms.

Anglo-Irish
There were two characteristics of Bowen’s Anglo-Irish background that gave her the
ability to see with la facultad. First, as Anglo-Irish she was a hybrid, well-positioned to embrace
border-crossing. The Anglo-Irish are a group of people who migrated to Ireland from England,
largely in the late seventeenth to mid-eighteenth centuries, settling land with their “rights” as
English colonizers. Over time, their ties with England were weakened and their connection to
Ireland strengthened. The result was that they became distanced and “foreign” in both Ireland
and England. Irish historian James C. Beckett argues that the Anglo-Irish are “in fact Irish,
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without any hyphenated prefix; and the fact that they must be distinguished by some special term
reflects the unhealed divisions of Ireland” (11). What Beckett overlooks is what social feminists
have sharpened their eyes to see. The subject is created through many varied apparati of
difference. Anglo-Irishness is part of the “diffèrance” of Irish people. This difference set Bowen
and other Anglo-Irish people apart from the rest of Ireland. Phyllis Lassner, one of the first
feminist critics of Bowen’s work, writes that Bowen was “Irish in England and English in
Ireland” (3). Lassner goes on to say that Bowen’s “dual identity is the source of her insights into
two cultures” (3). Using a social feminist lens, Anzaldùa sums up this insight as the mestiza
consciousness. She writes:
[. . .] the confluence of two or more genetic streams, with chromosomes constantly
‘crossing over,’ this mixture of races, rather than resulting in an inferior being, provides
hybrid progeny [. . .]. From this racial, ideological, cultural and biological crosspollinization, an ‘alien’ consciousness is presently in the making—a new mestiza
consciousness, una conciencia de mujer. It is a consciousness of the Borderlands. (100)
This borderland positionality gives the mestiza the ability to cross borders easily and continually.
In a poem that follows this passage in her book, Anzaldùa writes, “Because I, a mestiza,/
continually walk out of one culture/ and into another/ because I am in all cultures at the same
time” (100).
Bowen herself is explicitly clear about the influence of her Anglo-Irish ancestry on her
writing and about her ability to cross borders. In her second autobiographical work, Pictures and
Conversations (the title of which was taken from the first page of Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland, one of Irigaray’s favorite texts), unfinished and published posthumously, Bowen
writes:
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I am not placed: I do not qualify. The Bowen terrain cannot be demarcated on any
existing map; it is unspecified. Ireland and England, between them contain my stories,
with occasional outgoings into France or Italy: within the boundaries of those countries
there is no particular locality that I have staked a claim on or identified with. (35)
During her lifetime, Bowen lived both in England and Ireland, bouncing back and forth between
the two countries. As Heather Bryant Jordan explains, Bowen believed that her hybridity “gave
her a special passport to cross many fictional borders” (Jordan xvi).
Like Anzaldùa, Bowen sees the positive in her mestiza background: “I have thriven,
accordingly, on the changes and chances, the dislocations and (as I have said) the contrasts
which have made up so much of my life” (Pictures and Conversations 37). Lassner writes, “The
past that forms the central concerns of Elizabeth Bowen’s stories is her Anglo-Irish ancestry”
(3). She takes this past and the fluidity it has afforded her to cross through and over boundaries
and puts it to work crossing boundaries in her fiction. She is well-positioned to see that
boundaries can be crossed and that on the other side of every boundary is something illicit and
unknown to explore.
Her background prepared her both for border crossing and for seeing ghosts. Bowen’s
Irish roots embrace the idea of ghosts as a commonplace part of the everyday world. When
Jordan writes that she can see the Irish in Bowen’s writing she uses the ghosts as one example of
Bowen’s Irishness: “This [Irish] orientation manifests itself in her love of ghosts” (ix). Corcoran
relays an interesting ghost story contained in the Bowen family history. The very first Bowen in
Ireland, whom Elizabeth Bowen calls Henry I, was alive and well in Ireland when he appeared to
his wife, who was still living in South Wales, as a putrefied carcass. The story became wellknown among acquaintances and neighbors of the Bowens. The stigma of this ghost story
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supposedly drove Henry I insane and became a frequent theme for the rants of Bowen’s father
(also Henry) during his bouts of mental instability (Corcoran 26-7). In Bowen’s Court, Bowen
refers to the story twice, at the beginning and the end of the book. She wraps her family history
in the shroud of this ghost story. This story is significant because it gives further proof of
Bowen’s possession of la facultad, which has a long and rich tradition within her own family.
Moreover, Henry I’s ghost is not a walking, talking ghost, but a dead ghost, a carcass, which
very closely aligns this family ghost story with “Green Holly.”
I cannot find any evidence that indicates positively or negatively whether Bowen was
fascinated with ghosts in her “real life.” She was born near the height of popular spiritualism,
and she certainly would have been familiar with ghosts from that angle, as well as with the ghost
legends in her Irish ancestry, the most popular of which was the banshee. In her nonfiction work,
Bowen’s Court, she is matter-of-fact about the existence of ghosts in her family’s past and in the
house and on its grounds. She is neither fascinated nor repulsed by ghosts; she simply accepts
their existence as truth. I will do the same as I analyze her work.

Was Bowen a feminist?
If the same question were posed of her contemporary and friend, Virginia Woolf, it
would evoke a relatively simple response, “Yes, but she did not like the term ‘feminist.’” Some
would argue that the answer for Bowen is just as simple in the inverse, “No, and she did not care
for the entire feminist movement.” In her book-length study on Bowen and war, Jordan writes
that “Bowen readily admitted that she was not a feminist” (3). I do not think that it is useful to
determine whether or not Bowen considered herself a feminist. The ways in which popular
culture distorts and has distorted this term and the people who profess it have given many cause
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to distance themselves from it. What I do find enlightening about Bowen is how she combed the
history of her family and repeatedly pointed out the “othering” and silencing of Bowen women
in deference to Bowen men. In Bowen’s Court, she gave voice to long-dead female members of
her family who could not speak for themselves. Corcoran writes, “Bowen frequently notices the
scant attention paid to the family’s daughters and sisters compared to its sons and brothers in her
documentary sources,” which included wills, marriage documents, journals and letters (23). In
Bowen’s Court, two sisters—Mary and Hester—are mentioned in their father’s will along with
their brother, John. Of the sisters, Bowen notes that their “sex did not even allow them capital
letters in their father’s will” (77). Bowen goes on to lament the fact that these sisters do not get
any further mention in the family records that have survived and which she now possesses. She
conjectures that the sisters were “oppressed” and “no doubt led a muted existence, creeping
about. [. . .] They were not important, and they left little trace” (78). When Bowen drops variants
of the line “It is the haunted who haunt” repeatedly into her work, I cannot help but think of
these two sisters who sound very ghostly in Bowen’s description of them, “creeping about” and
leaving few traces of themselves. Bowen concludes her reflections on the sisters by observing
that “the past does certainly seem to belong to men” (78). So, it could be said that the “haunted”
are these women who led haunted lives in the masculine economy and go on to haunt a different
economy after their death. Of Bowen’s Court, Corcoran concludes, “the book has a subliminally
corrective and revisionist feminist impulse [. . .] it works from beneath through a subtle alteration
of interpretative perspective [. . .]” (23-4). I agree with Corcoran. I believe that Bowen
recognized the silencing of women in an economy that belonged to men. And I believe that she
sought to reclaim women’s voices for the future.
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The Destruction of War
Bowen’s background and her perspective on women’s place in history informed her
senses about ghosts and women. War brought the two together by disrupting all notions of the
subject and subjectivity. Elizabeth Bowen’s birth year is again significant, as 1899 is “the eve of
what has been called by many the century of ‘total war’” (Jordan xvii). Jordan says that “while
Bowen endured the several preceding wars [notably WWI, the Anglo-Irish War, and the Irish
Civil War], the brutality and totality of the Second World War affected her with a new kind of
intensity and urgency. She shared with her many contemporaries the horror of a war that came so
close to them” (1). Bowen wrote “Green Holly” and “The Happy Autumn Fields” during World
War II, between 1941 and 1944, while living in London. In her postscript to the first U. S.
edition of The Demon Lover and Other Stories, Bowen writes solely of war and its effects on
people, experience, and narrative. Bowen makes it clear that she believes war has a fragmenting,
destabilizing impact on subjectivity. This postscript is published in The Mulberry Tree, an
anthology of her nonfiction essays. In it, Bowen writes: “People whose homes had been blown
up went to infinite lengths to assemble bits of themselves [. . .]” (97). She writes, “Sometimes I
hardly knew where I stopped and somebody else began. The violent destruction of solid things,
the explosion of the illusion that prestige power and permanence attach to bulk and weight, left
all of us, equally, heady and disembodied” (Mulberry Tree 95). Selves and subjects are only
seemingly solid things, because the subject is a product of language and discourse. And if the
violent destruction of war can level a city block or destroy a countryside, what other seemingly
solid things can this violence undo? It can and did undo the solidity of the self.
Bowen writes that war and war-time experiences strongly influenced the stories in the
collection: “These are, more, studies of climate, war-climate, and the strange growths it raised”
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(Mulberry Tree 95). While the American edition of The Demon Lover was published after WWII
ended, she does not conclude that the end of a war brings one’s identity back to oneself. Instead,
she writes, “In wartime, even in Britain, much has been germinating. What, I do not know—who
does, yet, know?—but I felt the germination; and feel it, here and there in these stories [. . .]”
(98-9). I propose that this germination raised the “strange growth” of the incommensurable
feminine in the appearance of ghosts.
In this same postscript, Bowen explains that the ghosts in her stories are linked to
fragmented subjects. Of the ghosts, Bowen says, “It is the ‘I’ that is sought—and retrieved at the
cost of no little pain. And the ghosts [. . .] They are the certainties. . .they fill the vacuum for the
uncertain ‘I’” (95). Here, Bowen acknowledges that the “I,” the subject, is uncertain, thus
unstable. Bowen’s unstable “I” sounds a lot like the subject, which is a constant dialectical
becoming, always in flux and never fully stable, shifting as language shifts on the instability of
meaning and the impossibility of satiated desire. After acknowledging that the “I” is unstable,
Bowen goes on to say that ghosts are stable. To conflate Bowen’s statements would produce the
following logical progression: If the “I” is unstable, the opposite of that ‘I” must be something
stable. What Bowen poses as the stable opposite of the “I” is in fact a ghost, an apparition, a
figment. This sounds a lot like non-logic, like something outside of phallocentric reasoning and
sense. Bowen says that in the vacuum of the “I” is the ghost. And, as Lemaire has pointed out, it
is the unconscious that is repressed when the “I” comes into being. I argue that what gets
repressed when the “I” comes into being and what appears in the vacuum that the disappearing
“I” leaves behind is one and the same⎯ghosts. As Irigaray explains, the unconscious is the place
of the incommensurable feminine. So ghosts are the beings—not the subjects, but the beings or
apparitions—that appear where the “I” is not.
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As Bowen explains, war produces a world that is “out of proportion to our faculties for
knowing, thinking, and checking up” (Mulberry Tree 96), and when those ways of “normal”
knowing and thinking consist of masculinist logic, then ghosts appear as the incommensurable
feminine, who is incapable of subjectivity, incapable of being known, out of proportion in the
normal world. Bowen calls the war “abnormal” times (Mulberry Tree 95). By proposing these
ghosts as what appears when the “I” disappears, Bowen presents the first step towards Irigaray’s
attempt to “jam” theoretical machinery through an incommensurable feminine—the feminine
that Irigaray seeks in the vacuum of the unconscious.

“Green Holly”
In “Green Holly,” Bowen presents the incommensurable feminine in its most obvious
portrait with a thinking, talking, feeling ghost, who has her own voice and her own place within
the story. What evidence provides proof of my claim that the ghosts in these stories are the
incommensurable feminine? In her critical summary of Irigaray’s work, Grosz writes that
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’s concept of alterity is critical to Irigaray’s articulation of
feminine difference. Grosz explains that Levinas’ definition of alterity has four characteristics:
[. . .] first, it is a form of exteriority, separate from and unpredicted by the subject. [. . .]
Second, alterity is the site of excess, an unabsorbable, indigestible residue the subject is
unable to assimilate to itself. [. . .] Third, alterity is an infinite category: by this Levinas
means that it exceeds all boundaries, borders, constraints and limitations which the
subject attempts to impose on it. Fourth, alterity is conceived by Levinas as an activity, in
relation to which the subject is passively positioned. (142)
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This description of alterity, upon which Irigaray bases her conception of feminine difference,
exactly mirrors the female ghost in “Green Holly.” This thinking, feeling, acting ghost is outside
of the subject: she is a body that is both infinite and excessive.
In all my research, I did not find any sustained criticism on “Green Holly.” It is mentioned
in passing in criticisms of Bowen’s ghostly works, but never more than mentioned. It seems that
critics who seek to make sense of Bowen’s stories must avoid the story that most refuses
alignment with the project of sense. “Green Holly” revolves around the Christmas Eve activities
of seven characters living within the normal order and two ghosts that occupy the supernatural
realm. The natural characters are employed in covert government work during World War II and
have lived and worked together for several years in various country houses. The country house
once belonged to the two ghosts, a husband and wife who, while still living, took part in a
tragedy on Christmas Eve. The female ghost explains that she was bored with the country and
her husband’s “uninteresting jealousy” (723). Then, on Christmas Eve, the ghost says that there
were “so many men that one did not know where to turn” (723). So, she asks the reader via the
narrator’s vocalization, “How could she not make hay while the sun shone?” (723). The husband
discovers her infidelity at a Christmas Eve party and commits suicide that evening. Throughout
“Green Holly,” the male ghost lies silent and motionless on the hall floor at the base of the grand
staircase, gun in hand, with his blood smeared on the tile. The wife’s cause of death is never
revealed. She, however, did not cease to live after her death. She continues life in a ghostly
otherworld and begins an erotic relationship with Mr. Winterslow, one of the men in the house.
She and Winterslow can see, speak to, and feel one another. This story’s otherworld of a
thinking, talking, feeling, female ghost and the silence of her forever-dead husband can be
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explained as the hybrid pastiche of social and symbolic feminism creating a radical space of
feminine representation that exceeds the bounds of patriarchal logic.
The keys to unlocking the incommensurable feminine are forged when social and
psychoanalytic feminism are used together, as one critical framework. Social feminism helps us
to reverse logic and head backwards through sense into non-sense. Anzaldùa’s mestiza
consciousness embraces a supernatural, paranormal realm that exceeds the natural, logical order
to represent a feminine that exists on its own terms radically autonomous from the male.
The female ghost in “Green Holly” exists outside of the patriarchal symbolic order because
this ghost, as Bowen describes her, is “the bodiless foolish wanton” (Mulberry Tree 98) who
pursues her own desire at all costs. For Irigaray, the crux of the female’s lack in the masculinist
economy is her inability to access and explore her own sexual desire. Of the female, Irigaray
writes:
How can this object of transaction claim a right to pleasure without removing her/itself
from established commerce? [. . .] How could material substance enjoy her/itself without
provoking the consumer’s anxiety over the disappearance of his nurturing ground? (32)
In other words, how can woman, who belongs to men as an object for them to trade amongst
themselves (from father to husband, from brother to brother) attempt to claim rights for herself
and pursue her own desire? This is especially problematic since any desire expressed by woman
creates anxiety for man because it reveals the possibility of woman’s ability to pursue a path
outside of man’s control. The female ghost in “Green Holly” follows her own path of desire.
While living, she was overwhelmed at Christmas by “so many men that one did not know where
to turn” (723). She was her husband’s object, but “his uninteresting jealousy, his dull passion”
(724) drove her to pursue her own desire. That desire resulted in her husband’s suicide and,

38
while this is not made explicit in the text, most likely her death as well. She has provoked her
consumer’s anxiety to a fatal end. Not a shred remorseful, the ghost says of her infidelity, “She
had been silly, but it could not be helped” (723).
This reckless pursuit of her own desire is a mark of her position as the incommensurable
feminine. Irigaray immediately follows the passage above with the following:
How could that exchange—which can in no way be defined in terms ‘proper’ to woman’s
desire—appear as anything but a pure mirage, mere foolishness, all too readily obscured
by a more sensible discourse and by a system of apparently more tangible values?” (This
Sex 32).
The “exchange” Irigaray is referring to is woman’s desire, which is so out of bounds, so
detrimental to the masculinist economy that it cannot be defined “properly,” as no words can
capture it and insert it into the sense of this world’s system. When it crops up, the exchange of
woman’s desire appears as a “pure mirage,” as “mere foolishness.” And it is often readily
obscured by the “sensible” phallogocentric system. Both Bowen and the ghost admit to this
“foolishness”: Bowen calls the ghost “foolish,” and the ghost calls herself “silly.” But,
foolishness is a good thing when the goal is, as Irigaray describes it, to jam the theoretical
machinery, to suspend “its pretension to the production of a truth and of a meaning that are
excessively univocal” (This Sex 78). Woman’s desire is “pure mirage.” The woman who desires
is “pure mirage,” living and lusting as a ghost.
This ghost and Winterslow are having an affair. The details of their encounters are never
revealed, but the passion is evident. What makes this passion interesting is that the ghost is not
infatuated or in love with Winterslow as a man or a person. She is impassioned by her desire
alone. She only seeks a release for that desire. She finds her release in Winterslow. The ghost
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says, “Lovers cannot be choosers. He’d do. He would have to do” (724). By embracing her
desire and pursuing her passion, this woman-ghost “claim[s] a right to [her] pleasure,” which, as
Irigaray hints that it will, “remov[es] her/itself from established commerce” (This Sex 32). She
becomes “pure mirage” outside of the masculinist system.
In “Green Holly,” the narrative twist of locating a good portion of the story from within the
ghost’s perspective forces the reader to accept her as ghost—to accept the supernatural as an
alternate production of “truth.” Bowen grappled constantly with blending two identities, two
modes of thought, and two ways of being. Her hybrid position taught her that dichotomies not
only can be broken, but they have to be broken for survival. In “Green Holly,” the supposed truth
of the logical order is challenged and its logic is refuted by the equally true supernatural world.
When Mr. Winterslow is startled by a noise and a movement in the air, Mr. Rankstock, noticing
the same movement and noise, attributes it to a logical, natural cause. Rankstock says, “That is
only Miss Bates’s holly, flittering in the wind” (723). In response, Mr. Winterslow says, “But
there isn’t a wind tonight” (723). Winterslow’s statement refutes Rankstock’s logic and makes
the movement and noise the result of an otherworld. Even more convincing is the linguistic and
physical disruption the ghost causes within the narrative. Much of the story is told from the
female ghost’s perspective. In the middle of the narrative, the ghost’s voice—her truth—ruptures
the phallocentric logic and castrates its symbolic primacy. The narrator explains that the ghost
“discarded the feather boa,” “heard laughter,” “smiled and moved down the corridor to the
gallery,” and spoke several times to the living and ghostly characters (723). She thinks, moves,
speaks, and feels, making it impossible to dismiss her as a figment of somebody’s imagination or
a metaphor for something else, which is probably why, as I have mentioned, critics avoid
tackling “Green Holly.” A thinking, feeling, acting ghost defies the logical realm of
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understanding and criticism, unless one suspends logic and accepts her not a representation of
sense, but as the absolute proof of nonsense outside of the given masculine economy.
Other signs that the female ghost in “Green Holly” is the incommensurable feminine are
her speech and movement beyond her death, which stand in stark contrast to the silence and
motionlessness of the male ghost. Lemaire writes about the unconscious as Freud and Lacan
figured it: “the unconscious will be accessible only by way of a long and laborious analysis, as
all the forms in which the subject believes in all good faith that he will rejoin himself belong to
the autonomous order of symbolism which hold him prisoner” (69). Lemaire thus makes it clear
that the unconscious is outside of symbolism, which holds the subject prisoner. Thus, when
Irigaray posits that the unconscious represents the incommensurable feminine, then it must be
concluded that the incommensurable feminine is not prisoner to linguistic symbolism nor a
subject. She exists outside of its boundaries as something other than a subject.
In the masculine economy of logic, in the Lacanian symbolic order founded on the phallus,
the man is the primary subject, and the woman is his lesser, silent referent. But after the male
order falls away, the masculine subject ceases to exist and the redoubled feminine emerges,
proving her incommensurability with the given social articulations. Irigaray writes that women
are not “simply absorbed” in the function of the symbolic, “they also remain elsewhere” (This
Sex 76). The “elsewhere” where the feminine exists is the unconscious where the masculine
order refuses to go. Anzaldùa theorizes the supernatural as interchangeably the same as the
unconscious (17). So, in the supernatural world that exists beyond the symbolic, the female ghost
continues to exist. It is interesting that Henry I, the ghost in Bowen’s family history, appears not
as a moving, speaking, living ghost, but as a “putrefied carcass.” The ghost in Bowen’s past is a
dead male, like the dead male ghost in this story.
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In “Green Holly,” the female ghost speaks directly to the dead-male ghost saying, “You
should have let me explain” (723) and indicating that she has asked him why he did not
repeatedly to no avail. Following her statement, the narrator interjects: “The man made no
answer: he never had” (723). In the world beyond phallocentric order, the male ceases to exist as
subject, and the radical, para-normal feminine emerges to disrupt the supposed concrete truth of
the natural world. In the world beyond the masculine economy, the male has no voice, and the
woman finds ways to make meaning of her own not mediated by the ultimate sign, the phallus.
In “Green Holly,” the female ghost thinks, “[. . .] because of her years of death, there cut
an extreme anxiety: it was not merely a matter of, how was she? but of, was she—tonight—at
all? Death had left her to be her own mirror; for into no other was she able to see” (723). This
passage reveals two characteristics of the incommensurable feminine: one, that the mirror does
not work to establish subjectivity; and two, the incommensurable feminine is not an alternate
subject, but an existence that defies the logic of subjectivity altogether. Of the mirror stage,
Lemaire writes, “In this sense, then, the final balance of the mirror stage shows a profit: a total
representation of one’s own body” (Lemaire 177). But, as Irigaray explains, the “total”
representation of one’s own body is an image only reflected back to the male, not the female.
The female’s body is reflected in fragments. Irigaray writes that the woman experiences herself
“fragmentarily in the little-structured margins of a dominant ideology, as waste, or excess, what
is left of a mirror invested by the (masculine) ‘subject’ to reflect himself, to copy himself” (30).
For the incommensurable feminine the female body is not reflected at all in the mirror.
Thus, the mirror, a critical site for establishing subjectivity and recognizing oneself as a
subject, has no place in the otherworld of the incommensurable feminine. In “Green Holly,” the
ghost cannot see into a mirror. She can no longer establish her subjectivity through the logic of

42
the phallocentric order. Post-death, in this paranormal world, she acts as her own mirror and as
her own referent.
The female ghost in “Green Holly” provides a departure from the phallocentric order
because she has access to subjectivity in a world where subjectivity does not exist. The question
of “was she—tonight—at all” (723) reveals that she is not bound within a defining structure but
is loose and indefinable, sometimes to the point of not being at all. In “Ideology and the
Ideological State Apparatus,” Louis Althusser explains that the subject is tied up in the verb “to
be” (in Althusser’s case “etre”). He argues that the subject is about be-ing. This female ghost
cannot hold onto her ability to be. The narrator explains that “now the mills of death with their
catching wheels had stripped her of semblance” (Bowen 724). The ghost meets Irigaray’s
demands for the incommensurable feminine to neither “be the subject or the object” (This Sex
78) and Anzaldùa’s goal of the mestiza consciousness to “break down the subject-object duality
that keeps her a prisoner” (80) because the ghost does not hold up as subject or object at all.
Finally, her inability to maintain subjectivity is also the result of another important aspect
of the incommensurable feminine: fluidity. In This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray posits
fluidity to be the other, outside of philosophical discourse (112). Irigaray suggests that men are
solid and women are fluid. She writes, “The self-understanding of male sexuality is based on a
‘mechanics of solids’” (This Sex 117). She goes on to say, “The solidity sought by masculinity is
the result of congealing a feminine fluidity” (117-8). The female ghost’s fluidity is evident in
many places. The narrator says, “Her visibleness was not under her own control [. . .] it began to
dissolve in patches” (723). Here, her corporeal existence ebbs and flows like an ocean tide. Her
feather boa has been “dropped into the limbo that was her wardrobe now” (723), indicating that
her world and the things in it evaporate and condense depending on the situation. And she has
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the ability to move fluidly between the natural and supernatural worlds. The narrator explains
that the ghost “set up a sort of suction, an icy indrawing draught. Nor was this wholly psychic,
for an isolated holly leaf of Miss Bates’s, dropped at a turn of the staircase, twitched” (725). So,
in a supernatural world outside of masculine logic, the fluidity of the feminine emerges. The
ghost reveals what Irigaray means when she says that when woman does speak she speaks fluid
and where she speaks is in the “underside” of masculine economy (This Sex 113). And, as fluid,
the ghost also epitomizes Anzaldùa’s “psychic restlessness” (78). She “can’t hold concepts in
rigid boundaries” (78), and her flexibility allows her to stretch “horizontally and vertically” (79).
There is one last interesting twist to “Green Holly.” At the story’s end, Miss Bates,
another government employee living in the country house, can see the male ghost lying on the
floor. Miss Bates says that the male ghost is “stone dead” and “the man of [her] dreams” (726).
Miss Bates does not desire this man, she longs for the pursuit of her own desire. Miss Bates ends
her lament by seeking the ability to kill the male. In anguish, Miss Bates cries out to Winterslow,
“Who was she, your feathered friend, to deceive him? Who could have deceived him more
superbly than I?—I could be fatal [. . .] I could be fatal—only give me a break!” (726-7). She
passionately longs to “deceive,” to “claim a right to pleasure” and thus “provoke the consumer’s
anxiety.” Miss Bates’s zealous outburst aligns with what Irigaray says about woman’s desire:
“Their desire is often interpreted, and feared, as a sort of insatiable hunger, a voracity that will
swallow you whole” (This Sex 29). The female ghost is also voracious in her desire. Bowen
repeatedly punctuates her speech with exclamation marks. As if she had not heard him, the ghost
replies to Winterslow’s rebuff that their affair cannot go on: “‘I know!’ she agreed, with rapture,
casting her hands together. ‘We are mad—you and I. [. . .] It’s kismet,’ wailed the ghost zestfully
[. . .]” (724-5). In Ecrits Lacan states, “It is, therefore, the assumption of castration which creates
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the lack through which desire is instituted. Desire is the desire for desire, the desire of the Other
and it is subject to the Law” (quoted in Lemaire 164). Through a narrator’s vocalization, the
female ghost says, “She was left with—nay, had become—her obsession. Thus it is to be a
ghost” (724). Desire is not specific to what is desired. Desire is the same manifestation no matter
the object or goal desired. Desire is a need born out of a distance from what is desired. Winnubst
follows the concept of desire from Hegel to Lacan, stating: “This is no longer simply the desire
to be recognized by the other; it now becomes the desire to be the cause of desire in the other.
Desire thus performs itself in the symbolic register as the attempt to seduce the other– an attempt
on which the subject is dependent [. . .]” (17). But no matter to what lengths the subject goes in
response to its desire, as Winnubst writes, “desire still struggles to find its own impossible
satiation” (17). The ghost (and the incommensurable feminine) has kept her cake (desire) and is
eating it too. She is fully satisfied by her desire. Bowen has created in this ghost someone who
overcomes desire through complete satiation. The ghost is not distant from her desire because
she has become desire. By becoming desire, there is no longer a distance, which is necessary to
create desire.
The desire of this ghost is not the Lacanian desire to be or to have the phallus—to be what
the other desires. She has turned desire upon its head by possessing wholly that which cannot be
possessed. The economy in which the ghost exists is not the phallic field. Irigaray ends the latter
passage about woman’s desire by saying, “[woman’s desire] really involves a different economy
[. . .] one that upsets the linearity of a project, undermines the goal-object of a desire [. . .]
disconcerts fidelity toward a single discourse . . .” (29-30). “Thus it is to be a ghost” (724). Thus
it is to be the incommensurable feminine.
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Establishing the “femmosexual” in “The Happy Autumn Fields”
Like “Green Holly,” “The Happy Autumn Fields” (THAF) is set apart from other Bowen
ghost stories because the female ghost in the story speaks and feels, inserting her own voice into
the narrative. In this short story, the ghost of Sarah, a young woman of a Victorian countryside,
inhabits the body of Mary, a young woman living in World War II-era London. Sarah’s ghost
uses Mary’s living flesh as her host in an effort to restore wholeness to the female form by
reuniting the feminine with itself at the moment the phallus disrupts and co-opts the feminine to
define her as its referent. Sarah’s possession, timed at this moment in both her life and Mary’s,
creates space for the incommensurable feminine and her articulation of a new self with new
bonds, new values and new ways of being.
The story opens with Sarah taking a walk across her father’s fields in autumn. During
Sarah’s walk, the story abruptly shifts to Mary, who is lying on a bed in her bombed London
townhouse. The story follows Mary—or, as I argue, Sarah’s possession of Mary—for a time
while Sarah-as-Mary interacts with Mary’s lover, Travis. The story then abruptly shifts to Sarah
as she gathers with her family in the drawing room of their home. The last sudden shift of the
story takes the reader back to Mary in her townhouse.
Out of the many texts I surveyed that examined “The Happy Autumn Fields,” all but two
come to a conclusion that never even admits a possibility of possession. The overwhelming
majority of critics argue that the flip-flop of THAF’s narrative between Victorian countryside
and 1940s London is the result of Mary’s psychological instability and a dream that is an effect
of that instability. Martin Bidney believes that Mary succumbs:
to the deadly lure of nostalgia, its power to keep one's selfish will fixated on preserving
an idealized mind-set held over from childhood. We will see that the narcissism here,
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though less evident at first glance, is darkly pervasive, even tragic. A box of letters and
photos, coming to the attention of Mary in blitzed-out London, serves as a departurepoint for her dreams of a Victorian past [. . .]. (17)
Bidney is so convinced that Mary has “dreamed herself into the life of mid-Victorian Sarah” (17)
that he haughtily refutes the only critic who argues an alternative possibility for the story’s dual
realities. Of Brad Hooper’s essay, “Elizabeth Bowen’s ‘The Happy Autumn Fields’: A Dream or
Not?,” Bidney says, “[Hooper] points out certain incongruous phrasings that seem to make the
two stories coequal in reality-status rather than clearly Mary’s dream of Sarah.” Hooper does not
believe that Mary dreams Sarah, writing, “Bowen did in fact create dual realities with a shared
character, not one reality on one hand and a ‘saving hallucination’ (p. xi) on the other” (153).
Corcoran makes a brief reference to the possibility of a ghostly possession when he writes that
Mary is either experiencing a dream “[. . .] or, it is hinted, in some form of metempsychosis [. .
.]” (148).
Hooper and Corcoran aside, all of the critics have simply assumed that this story is about
a dream and not ghostly possession. By refusing to see beyond accepted logic, they close down
all possibility of engaging in a truly transformative reading of this story, which I believe much
more closely aligns with the tone and spirit of the story. I disagree with the critics who have
preceded me. I argue that THAF is clearly a story of ghostly possession, not one about a dream
or a hallucination. I read the story using lenses that are open to the possibility of ghosts. THAF is
the story of a ghost, Sarah, who possesses the body of Mary in order to transform the symbolic
world and articulate a language that unites man and woman at the moment that the phallus
divides them.
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As Elizabeth Grosz has noted, Irigaray sees the feminine in its incommensurable form as
“the threat the unconscious poses to civilization in its symptomatic ‘return’” (Grosz 107). By
possessing Mary and entering the natural realm via Mary’s body, Sarah manages to return to
civilization, to overcome the “truth” and “primacy” of death and reinvade the phallic economy as
a ghost, out of order and out of step with what is acceptable and logical. While her return as a
ghost is an obvious disruption of the logical order, her intent in her return is also a disruption.
Sarah intends to rewrite the moment of phallic disruption and maintain feminine autoeroticism,
continuity, and wholeness of form. If the unconscious overcomes its repression/oppression and
returns to disrupt, interrupt, disturb and defraud the phallic economy, then she returns as the
incommensurable feminine. She disrupts the phallic economy because she comes to reunite the
feminine with herself and, in doing so, to divert the supposed inevitability of the “A/–A”
equation.
“The Happy Autumn Fields” opens with an idyllic, pastoral scene from a Victorian
countryside. While never stated, the time of the scene can be placed by various clues from the
women’s clothing, the gas lamps, the photos of the family, the phaeton (which appears in a
photo), and the carte de visite that will also appear later. Most critics assume that the countryside
is the Irish countryside. Corcoran writes that “Most readers instinctively feel that, although this is
never stated, the Victorian part of “The Happy Autumn Fields” is set in Ireland, not only because
of the descriptions of the landscape but also because of the quasi-feudal landlordism which its
social system appears to suggest” (149). In this opening scene, Sarah and her younger sister
Henrietta bring up the rear of a family excursion across her father’s fields in early autumn. The
family processional is led by Sarah’s father, “Papa.” Papa is flanked by his eldest daughter,
Constance, and his youngest son, Arthur. Walking behind these three is a son, Robert, who walks
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with a cousin, Theodore. A daughter, Emily, keeps pace with the two older boys. Two primary
school-age sons, Digby and Lucius, walk together. And, finally, Sarah and Henrietta fall behind
the others. This scene, which comprises one-third of the entire story, is overly idyllic. It presents
the perfection of this family jaunt but reveals it as staged perfection. It sets up the perfect familial
tableau, and then undercuts it with subversive revelations articulated by Sarah and shared
between the two sisters.
The title of the story sets the stage for idealism. Immediately, one assumes that “The
Happy Autumn Fields” are the fields upon which the family treads, as the title leads directly to
the first five paragraphs of the story, which describe fields in autumn and the family’s procession
across those fields:
The family walking party, though it comprised so many, did not deploy or straggle over
the stubble but kept in a procession of threes and twos. Papa, who carried his Alpine
stick, led, flanked by Constance and little Arthur.
[. . .] The harvest had been good and was now in: he was satisfied—for this
afternoon he had made the instinctive choice of his most womanly daughter, most nearly
infant son. Arthur, whose hand Papa was holding, took an anxious hop, a skip and a jump
to every stride of the great man’s. As for Constance—Sarah could often see the flash of
her hat-feather as she turned her head, the curve of her close bodice as she turned her
torso. [. . .]
The landowner’s daughters, from Constance down, walked with their beetlegreen, mole or maroon skirts gathered up and carried clear of the ground, but for
Henrietta, who was still ankle-free. [. . .] Behind them, rooks that had risen and circled,
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sun striking blue from their blue-black wings, planed one by one to the earth and settled
to peck again.
[. . .] while from the cottage inside the screen of trees wood-smoke rose melting
pungent and blue. This was the eve of the brothers’ return to school. (671-2)
In these initial paragraphs that describe the family procession, the scene seems ideally Victorian.
The sun is shining and the male landowner, described as a “great man,” has just reaped his
bountiful harvest. His fertilization of the earth has brought him an abundant return. He walks the
land, marking the territory that he owns with his crossing of the fields. Along on his walk, he
brings with him his bounty of children—the signs of his familial fertility, his masculine virility.
Papa’s eight children span a wide breadth of ages and include both genders; however, the
majority of the children are male when the eldest son, who will appear later, is included in the
count. The male children are the signs that Papa’s line will continue and that the name of the
father will be passed on. The narrative emphasizes the familial structure headed by the father and
intended for the future command of the sons. He leads this procession as the archetypal father in
the Oedipal drama.
This ideality of this Victorian scene, however, will not hold up under the weight of
feminine scrutiny. Sarah interjects quick, short statements into the ideal description that closely
read this family drama. In the previous quotation from THAF’s first five paragraphs, I have
omitted several sentences. I will focus on each of these omissions, as each is one of Sarah’s
interjections into this scene focalized by the story’s narrator. Most of the time, Sarah’s
interjections into the narration are marked by her name. For example, “It was Sarah who saw
[. . .], Sarah knew [. . .], and Sarah could often see [. . .].” Occasionally, her thought is not
marked by her name. In these instances, Sarah is making her most subversive observations. In
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these cases, one can distinguish between Sarah’s thoughts and the narrator’s narration because
Sarah’s observations are below the surface. They are the observations of one who can hear what
is not said, sense what is not made plain, and see those things that do not appear readily to
untrained eyes. They are the observations of someone who understands that other worlds and
other truths exist below the surface and beyond this realm. The narrator’s utilitarian descriptions
are of the outsides of things, including objects, people, and the landscape. Sarah’s interjections
are in excess of the obvious and intimately connected with the personal, the insides of people and
landscapes.
When Sarah’s close readings are closely read, the family drama is revealed as a
production of phallocentric order, which represses and oppresses the drama’s actors. A close
reading of these lines reveals Sarah’s acute critique of this phallic portrait of perfection and
normalcy. As Althusser explains in “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus,” “Ideology
represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (137).
As a Marxist, Althusser’s “real” is the truth of each subject’s negotiations as both oppressor and
oppressed. The oppression that one lives under and the oppression that one inflicts upon another
are dressed up and covered over, then presented as something else in order to continue the work
of oppression. This is ideology at work. It co-opts people into the system by presenting an
“imaginary relationship” that mediates the truth of an existence by making it look pretty, or at
least palatable. Althusser says that “these world outlooks need only to be ‘interpreted’ to
discover the world of reality behind their imaginary representation” (158). Sarah recognizes this
patriarchal ideology, recognizes its tenuous staging, and interprets the reality of the places that
her father and her siblings hold. Specifically, Sarah recognizes the critical roles of the feminine
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and the masculine in this staging. Sarah interprets the Victorian and Oedipal allusions around her
to discover the “realities” behind the ideological myths.
In Sarah’s first critical reading of this scene, she recognizes and reads the varying
subject-positions of her family members and their difference from each other. The narrator says,
“It was Sarah who saw the others [. . .] who knew them, knew what they were to each other,
knew their names and knew her own” (671). Althusser explains that the name and the
recognition of the name are markers of subjectivity. He says, “calling you by your name, the fact
of knowing, even if I do not know what it is, that you have a name of your own [. . .] means that
you are recognized as a unique subject” (162). It is the recognition of one’s own subjectivity,
and one’s difference from another’s subjectivity, that interpellates beings as subjects. Sarah
knows her name and her siblings’ names, which is akin to saying that she knows her position as
subject in relation to her siblings and recognizes their subject-positions in relation to each other.
Sarah continuously interrupts the autumn afternoon to make quietly subversive
observations about the various subject-positions of herself and her siblings. As for the daughters,
Sarah notices that the fate of her father’s daughters is predictable and circumscribed. They will
marry, and each marriage will mark a transfer of the daughter from father/brother-owner to
husband-owner. The narrative makes clear that the daughters’ part to play in this familial
structure is that of items of exchange passed from father or brother to husband. The female
children are Papa’s units of exchange.
The occasion for the walk provides the first evidence to support the idea that the women
are valued as units of exchange, not for their unique familial contributions. The occasion for the
walk is to commemorate the day before Papa’s sons—all but Arthur, who is too young—will
return to school. His sons are afforded the privilege of education and his daughters are not under
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the assumption that the sons will contribute to society and further its projects, while the
daughters will not. His daughters will not go to school, but we learn that their fate, though
different, is scheduled with the same rigor, regularity, and resolve as a school term. The
daughters will marry.
His eldest daughter is chosen as his female companion because she is most ripe for this
exchange with another man. As Irigaray explains, “Women are marked phallicly by their fathers,
husbands, procurers. And this branding determines their value [. . .]” (31). THAF’s description of
Constance emphasizes this fact by playing up her sexuality. The description mentions her
“turned” head, her “turned” torso, the “curve of her close bodice,” the “flash” of her feather.
Constance is ready for her marriage, and she has already given her mind to her future husband.
The narrator says, “It was Sarah who located the thoughts of Constance” (671). Sarah notices
that Constance has shifted from her father’s object to her husband-to-be’s object by marking a
shift in Constance’s thoughts. Sarah observes, “Constance gave Papa her attention, but not her
thoughts, for she had already been sought in marriage” (671). This is an example of an instance
where Sarah interjects her voice into the narrative, without focalization from the narrator. This is
an example of Sarah’s ability to hear and see what is below the surface, what must be sensed.
Sarah says that Constance has been sought in marriage. “Sought” indicates that a suitor has made
the legitimate pursuit of Constance as a wife by seeking her father’s permission to take her hand
in marriage. Sarah is not a confidant of Constance, as the text will reveal later. Thus, Sarah’s
knowledge of this fact indicates that the proposal has been accepted and made public to the
family. Constance has been exchanged, and she has moved her alignment as a female subject
from the “A” of her father to the “A” of her husband.
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Emily, the second-oldest daughter, is also near the appropriate age for exchange, which is
why she attaches herself to the one male in the party who is not a sibling. Emily is described as
being “attached but not quite abreast” of Robert and Theodore (671). The narrator says that
Sarah “felt to the depths of Emily’s pique at Cousin Theodore’s inattention” (671). Sarah notices
that Emily works fervently to little avail to capture the attention of Theodore. Emily is beginning
to make herself available on the “market” and wishes to attract someone who will seek her in
marriage. Interestingly, the mother, who is married, is not on this walk. Unlike the daughters, she
is no longer available as a commodity for exchange. Thus, the mother is sequestered in the
private, domestic realm, removed from public display. Sarah sees the women’s subjectivity
within the context of their market availability. She knows that where women stand in relation to
the marriage market determines their position as subjects.
However, Sarah does not end her observations of the female family members with this
pithy understanding of how women are exchanged from man to man. She deepens her
observations into criticism when she makes an observation about all the daughters, including
herself but excluding Henrietta. Sarah surveys the daughters’ heavy skirts, which each has to
“gather up” and carry “clear of the ground,” and thinks, “They walked inside a continuous stuffy
sound, but left silence behind them” (671). The women’s dresses, which Sarah describes before
making this comment, are symbols of their repression. In Hamlet, Ophelia’s suicide by drowning
is successful thanks to her heavy skirts. No stones are needed; the heavy dress that is prescribed
as appropriate for a woman to wear sinks her to the bottom of the river—literally oppresses her
to the point of death. These women’s heavy dresses are likewise symbols of the weight of the
ideology that represses them. The repression is “continuous,” there is no end to it. “Stuffy” gets
at the oppression and repression. A stuffy room is oppressive. It is hard for one to breathe in
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stuffy air. A stuffy person or a stuffy dogma is repressive. The silence behind them references
the lack of voice given to women in this society. In Bowen’s Court, Bowen recognized the
silence forced upon her female ancestors and sought to rectify it and give them their voices back.
Here, Sarah recognizes the silence that these women leave behind them, not because they cannot
speak, but because their voices are muffled and repressed by the stuffy oppression of ideology
that privileges the male.
Sarah observes that the men are privileged, but she also perceives that there is a hierarchy
that affords more privilege to some than to others. What determines the men’s subject-positions
is their position within the family’s line of inheritance. The narrator says, “The field and all these
outlying fields in view knew as Sarah knew that they were Papa’s” (671). The father is clearly
the current possessor of this wealth. He will pass this property on to his eldest son, Fitzgeorge.
Of the second-eldest son, Robert, Sarah thinks, “Robert, it could be felt, was not unwilling to
return to his books; next year he would go to college like Theodore; besides to all this they saw
he was not the heir” (672). Of the younger brothers, Digby and Lucius, she says, “these two were
further from being heirs than Robert” (672). Sarah understands that the privilege of the male is
not a privilege that is spread evenly. Sarah reads what is not said, sees through what is
imaginary, and senses the oppression that undergirds the success of this masculine project.
Why does it matter that Sarah makes these acute, quietly subversive observations about her
siblings’ subject-positions? It is because she recognizes the falsehood of phallogocentrism that
she can and does return as a ghost. She knows that this ideology does not hold the monopoly on
truth and that another “truth” does exist and even co-exists alongside this “truth.” Sarah disrupts
the phallic order as a ghost because she knows it can be disrupted. Sarah mirrors Anzaldùa’s
mestiza consciousness, which allows the underside of things to be seen, accessed, lived and
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accepted when perceived through la facultad, an alternate lens of truth. Sarah certainly sees the
underside of the Oedipal truth. She disrupts that truth in order to present an alternative truth with
alternative values and ways of being outside of phallic logic and phallic context. The alternative
truth will make it possibile for a new logic to coexist beside, and thus disrupt, phallocentric
logic.
Henrietta and Sarah are extremely close. The two sisters walk next to each other, slightly
removed from the rest of the family procession as a sign of their sameness with one another and
their difference from the rest. The narrator says, “Between the two [Henrietta and Sarah] and the
others the distance widened; it began to seem that they would be left alone” (673). Their
difference from the rest of the family is a mark of their unusualness and their unusual closeness
to each other. As Sarah considers her siblings and the afternoon walk in the story’s first
paragraphs, she thinks most passionately about Henrietta: “Most she [Sarah] knew that she swam
with love at the nearness of Henrietta’s young and alert face and eyes which shone with the sky
and queried the afternoon” (672). When Sarah laments that the brothers are leaving, Henrietta
questions the sincerity of her remorse, and Sarah responds, “More I was thinking that you and I
will be back together again at the table. . .” (672). Henrietta concurs with Sarah and responds by
saying, “‘You know we are always sad when the boys are leaving, but we are never sad when the
boys have gone.’ The sweet reciprocal guilty smile that started on Henrietta’s lips finished on
those of Sarah” (672). The two sisters will not be sad when the males leave the house. They
relish the months they spend without the male presence. It is the presence of each other only that
satisfies them. Sarah thinks, “She must never have to wake in the early morning except to the
birdlike stirrings of Henrietta, or have her cheek brushed in the dark by the frill of another pillow
in whose hollow did not repose Henrietta’s cheek. Rather than they should cease to lie in the
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same bed she prayed they might lie in the same grave” (672). Henrietta shares Sarah’s
attachment to her sister. Henrietta, the younger of the two sisters, says to Sarah, “But I cannot
forget that you chose to be born without me; that you would not wait —” (672).
Their extreme emotional and physical closeness resembles the closeness of the feminine
as Irigaray argues that she exists before the male divides her. Irigaray writes that the feminine—
the feminine as she exists in her incommensurable form—“is neither one nor two. Rigorously
speaking, she cannot be identified either as one person or as two” (This Sex 26). The two sisters
are so close that “they looked around them with the same eyes” (673), they “cast one shadow
across the stubble” (674), and they “were seldom known to address or question one another in
public” (681). And between the two of them they have vocalized their wish to be born together
from the same womb and die together lying in the same grave, as if having lived one life. They
embody Irigaray’s feminine who is both one and two.
This idea that the feminine is both one and two and neither one nor two defies logic—
specifically phallic logic. It coincides with the logic of the female sexual organs instead. Irigaray
writes:
Thus, for example, woman’s autoeroticism is very different from man’s. In order to touch
himself, man needs an instrument [. . .] As for woman, she touches herself in and of
herself without any need for mediation [. . .] woman “touches herself” all the time, and
moreover no one can forbid her to do so, for her genitals are formed of two lips in
continuous contact. Thus, within herself she is already two, but not divisible into
one(s)—that caress each other. (24)
Henrietta and Sarah are sustained by the tangible touch of each other and the emotional touch of
having another female so close. Their closeness seems slightly uncanny, and it distances them
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from the other siblings. Their falling so far behind the other siblings on this walk is indicative of
their distance from them. Their closeness is strange because it defies logic by situating the sisters
outside of the “normal” progression/matriculation/socialization of the Oedipus. It also
exemplifies Irigaray’s concept of autoeroticism because the sisters are certainly not homosexual
lovers. They are fulfilled and gratified by one another. However, they find this fulfillment and
gratification specifically because they are the same as one another, yet different from the rest.
They embody autoeroticism. Their sameness is their pleasure. Their nearness is their joy.
Within the phallic economy, Henrietta and Sarah have managed to get close to the
realization of an incommensurable feminine. However, autoeroticism does not last in the
phallocentric economy. Sarah and Henrietta’s close relationship can be threatened by outside
forces. And, on this happy autumn day, it is threatened by a male intruder.
As Sarah and Henrietta discuss their impending separation from their brothers when the
boys return to school, Henrietta worries about another kind of separation, a separation that she
will experience for the first time. Henrietta says, “But oh how should I feel, and how should you
feel, if it were something that had not happened before?” (672). Sarah responds by mentioning
the elder sister, Constance: “For instance, when Constance goes to be married?” (672). Henrietta
responds quickly, “Oh, I don’t mean Constance!” (673). Henrietta does not refute the marriage
part of Sarah’s statement. It is the reference to Constance that she takes issue with. Being
separated from Constance is not the separation that Henrietta fears. Henrietta fears being
separated from Sarah, and she fears that, as in marriage, a man will separate her from her
beloved sister.
Like Henrietta, Sarah senses something on the horizon, but she hopes that this something
will not pull them apart: “‘So long,’ said Sarah, considering, ‘as, whatever it is, it happens to
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both of us?’” (672). Sarah articulates this thought as a question, because she ultimately
understands that “it” cannot happen to both of them at once. It must divide them. The “it” is the
entrance of the phallus into their female equation. The phallus will divide them from each other
and, ultimately, from their own feminine selves. Irigaray explains that “autoeroticism is
interrupted by a violent break-in: the brutal separation of the two lips by a violating penis, an
instrument that distracts and deflects this woman from this ‘self-caressing’ she needs if she is not
to incur the disappearance of her own pleasure” (This Sex 24). In this case, the phallus is
represented by a man who seeks to divide them by attaching himself erotically to Sarah. If he
succeeds in gaining Sarah’s affection, he will pull the sisters apart and, like the penis that
Irigaray references, he will “break in” between the two sisters and separate them from
themselves. The one that is two, which is one, will become distinctly two and fall into the pattern
of “A/–A.” In response to Henrietta’s concern at a new, previously unexperienced separation,
Sarah says, “You and I will stay as we are” [. . .] “then nothing can touch one without touching
the other” (672). But, if the phallus is to touch them, then they cannot stay as they are. And the
act of its touching—its break-in—will do just what Henrietta predicts; it will tear them apart.
As the two sisters fall further behind the rest of the family, they are gained upon by their
eldest brother Fitzgeorge and his friend Eugene. It could be said that at the moment that they
further separate themselves from phallic logic, ideology finds them and finds a way to co-opt
them. It is a critical moment in the sisters’ lives. Henrietta waves vigorously to Fitzgeorge and
Eugene as they approach the two sisters on horseback. She entreats Sarah to wave, and Sarah
refuses. The prospect of Eugene’s appearance creates tension between the two girls when
Henrietta realizes that Sarah is affected by Eugene:
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“I can see you are shy,” [Henrietta] said in a dead voice. “So shy you won’t even wave to
Fitzgeorge?”
Her way of not speaking the other name had a hundred meanings; she drove them
all in by the way she did not look at Sarah’s face. [. . .] her eyes—till now at their
brightest, their most speaking—dulled with uncomprehending solitary alarm. (674)
It quickly becomes obvious that Eugene is the other name. The narrator says, “The ordeal of
awaiting Eugene’s approach thus became for Sarah, from moment to moment, torture” (674).
Sarah and Eugene have established a connection, and both sisters seem to sense that today the
connection will become a tie that breaks the sisters’ bond.
Upon approaching the sisters, Fitzgeorge attempts to ride ahead and join the rest of the
family. He does not, however, because Eugene quickly dismounts his horse to walk with the
sisters. The narrator says, “Eugene had dismounted. Fitzgeorge saw, shrugged and flicked his
horse to a trot; but Eugene led his slowly between the sisters. Or rather, Sarah walked on his left
hand, the horse on his right and Henrietta the other side of the horse” (675). The description is
clear, Eugene has separated the sisters. It is worth noting that the “his” that is led slowly between
the sisters is not explicitly stated. The text leaves the “his” ambigious. The “his” may literally be
the horse, but, figuratively, it is him; it is his penis, which is the stand-in for, the closest thing to,
the phallus. He has broken between them and chosen Sarah as his “-A.” Henrietta, on the other
hand, has to stand on the other side of the horse. This separation immediately divides the sisters
and creates single subjects, where previously they were two as one and one as two. The break-in
of Eugene leaves “Henrietta, acting like somebody quite alone, looking up at the sky, idly
holding one of the empty stirrups” (675). The break-in has left Henrietta alone and made separate
subjects of them both.
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Sarah and Eugene share a few erotically charged moments as they walk together. There
are smiles exchanged, heads bent toward each other, mutual blushing, and “the consummation
would be when their eyes met” (675). This exchange is interrupted by Henrietta’s pain of
separation, “At the other side of the horse, Henrietta began to sing. At once her pain, like a
scientific ray, passed through the horse and Eugene to penetrate Sarah’s heart” (675). Sarah is
affected by this pain, but she is not necessarily affected at the moment in time that Henrietta
sings. The next few thoughts of Sarah’s are rife with extreme urgency and emotion. But they are
not completely the urgency of Sarah, the girl in the Victorian countryside. They are also the
urgency and emotion of Sarah the ghost, as very shortly the narrative will shift forward to the
future when Sarah wakes up in Mary’s body. What Sarah says as she crosses over to WWII-era
London is: “Stop oh stop Henrietta’s heartbreaking singing! Embrace her close again! Speak the
only possible word! Say—oh, say what? Oh, the word is lost!” (675). Sarah seeks to embrace her
sister again. To overcome the phallic break-in and restore the autoerotism she needs to have
Henrietta near. Sarah’s strong desire to speak is related to her loss of a shared language with her
sister. But she cannot find the language necessary to speak this loss.
Words are important to Sarah because language is what structures the subject and prevents
her from articulating a scenario that will allow her to remain near Henrietta. Lacan believed that
language is “always seeking to ‘rationalize,’ to ‘repress’ the lived experience” (Lemaire 53).
There is little language available in this world to describe the supernatural and its sightings and
apparitions that disrupt the truth of the normal, symbolized order. That is precisely why these
worlds are called paranormal and supernatural. While they are undoubtedly outside of the
“rational” world of the symbolic they cannot be encapsulated in language in any defining terms.
So they are simply called super[above, more than]natural and para[beyond]normal. Lemaire
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writes that “language is above all the organ of communication and reflection upon a lived
experience which it is often not able to go beyond” (53). It is fortunate for the incommensurable
feminine that language cannot fully encapsulate this beyond world. All that language can do is
shove the paranormal sightings into darkened attics, abandoned graveyards, or irrational (often
female) minds. An occasional brush with this world is inevitable, but language always seeks to
find “concepts [that] organize things which were at first sight confused” (Lemaire 67). As the
story will soon reveal, Sarah searches for a language and a symbolic world that will allow her to
express herself as the incommensurable feminine. She does not find the language, which is
(paradoxically) how she remains the incommensurable feminine.
Later in the story, but shortly following Eugene’s break-in, when Henrietta asks Sarah a
question, the narrator says, “The sisters were seldom known to address or question one another
in public; it was taken that they knew each other’s minds” (681). The sisters have lost their
ability to communicate with one another without language because phallic language—the
language that marks the feminine as the inverse of the male—has entered. The sisters no longer
know each other’s mind—no longer are affirmed by each other. Sarah’s mind is shifting, not
from father to husband, but from sister to husband—from woman to man. They no longer
communicate with one another via a system outside of language.
To live as the unconscious one must live outside of the symbolic order. Living outside of
the symbolic order is to live as a ghost. The woman is uniquely positioned to live as a ghost
because she acts as medium in the phallocentric order. Irigaray writes, “Woman exists only as an
occasion for mediation, transaction, transition, transference, between man and his fellow man,
indeed between man and himself” (This Sex 193). She insists on a fluidity of the feminine, where
the feminine slips in and out of the world like a ghost. Irigaray writes that the “woman-thing”
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“speaks ‘fluid’ in the paralytic undersides of that [phallocratic] economy” (This Sex 111). In her
later work, still seeking to find a place for the feminine outside of phallogocentrism, Irigaray
writes in “Is the Subject of Science Sexed?”:
Feminine sexuality could be better brought into harmony…with…‘dissipating
structures’ that operate via the exchange with the external world, structures that
proceed through levels of energy. The organizational principles of these structures
has nothing to do with the search for equilibrium but rather with the crossing of
thresholds. (81)
The fluidity and dissipating structures of women make it impossible for them to be “simply
absorbed” in the function of the symbolic; women must “also remain elsewhere” (This Sex 76).
The “elsewhere” where the feminine exists is the supernatural – the realm of ghosts. She exists
there as a ghost—a ghost that takes the unconscious and its non-order as its life. So in the
supernatural world that exists beyond the symbolic order, the incommensurable feminine as
ghost continues to exist.
It is at this moment, when Eugene—the male—has entered the narrative and separated
Sarah and Henrietta, that the story crosses over from Victorian Ireland to WWII London during
the blitz. This is the scene, the point in time, to which Sarah keeps returning via Mary’s body as
a conduit. Why this point of disruption? Because it is the ultimate point of disruption for the
feminine; it is the moment that divides her from herself and causes her to become the referent to
the man. Sarah follows her cry of “Say—oh, say what? Oh, the word is lost!” with “Henrietta…”
(675). And yet “Henrietta…” is spoken by another body in another place and time. Physically,
the text records this gap by inserting an entire blank line between “Oh, the word is lost!” and
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“Henrietta…” The reader must cross over this emptiness, this abyss, and make the leap to
Henrietta’s name spoken by Sarah through Mary.
Why does Sarah choose possession of another woman as her mode of haunting? Before
answering this question, I find it necessary to prove that this is possession and not the
hallucination of a psychologically unstable mind. There are good reasons why Mary could be
psychologically unstable. She is living in a war-torn country, and her home has recently been
bombed. Travis, her boyfriend, certainly thinks that she is unstable—and takes the opportunity to
inform her of his diagnosis more than once. But I would argue that his “diagnosis” simply
reflects his inability to comprehend feminine logic, as it is the un-logic of non-logic. What I draw
on to prove that Sarah possesses Mary is the voice of Sarah that clearly speaks from within
Mary. Sarah “[. . .] all but afforded a smile at the grotesquerie of being saddled with Mary’s body
and lover” (677). And, “Rearing up her head from the bare pillow, she looked, as far as the
crossed feet, along the form inside which she found herself trapped: the irrelevant body of Mary”
(677). Then, later, “she yawned into Mary’s hand” (677). There seems no question that another
mind inhabits Mary’s body.
And why Mary—why this “irrelevant” body? She has two things of value for Sarah. In
her home, Mary possesses many records, mostly photographs and letters, of Sarah and
Henrietta’s family. Moreover, Mary is herself positioned at a critical moment of phallic break-in.
Her male friend, Travis, is attempting to co-opt her life and move her from her home to a hotel
room that he has reserved for her. To be fair, Mary’s home is not safe. It has been severely
damaged by a bombing, and more raids are expected in her neighborhood. However, Sarah, her
perception still keen, notes the heavy-handed way in which Travis attempts to direct Mary’s life.
Sarah thinks, “His possessive angry fondness was part, of course, of the story of him and Mary [.
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. .]” (677). And, in this instance, he is specifically separating Mary from her home and from
these artifacts that help articulate the story of Sarah and Henrietta’s life.
These artifacts are of great value because they speak with a feminine language the story
of a feminine form. In response to Travis’s belligerent insistence that Mary leave the house,
Sarah says from Mary’s body, “But I’ve made a start, I’ve been pulling out things of value or
things I want” (677). Travis’s response to this statement reveals what is valued in the phallic
economy and what is disvalued: “For answer Travis turned to look down, expressively, at some
object out of her sight [. . .] ‘I see,’ he said, ‘a musty old leather box gaping open with God
knows what—junk, illegible letters, diaries, yellow photographs, chiefly plaster and dust. Of all
things, Mary!—after a missing will?’” (677). He sees the items that do not have monetary
value—letters, diaries, and photos—as valueless. Thus, he assumes Mary must be searching for
an old will, something that will bring monetary gain by providing Mary with ownership and
possession—possession of a concrete kind, that is. His statement places value on what can be
owned and exchanged and renders Sarah and Henrietta’s bond and their autoeroticism of
nearness valueless. Irigaray argues that “Ownership and property are quite foreign to the
feminine” (This Sex 31). Instead, what the feminine values is “what is so near that she cannot
have it, nor have herself” (This Sex 31). Irigaray says that this reversal of thinking causes an
upset in the “prevailing” phallic economies (This Sex 31). Sarah knows what is valuable, and she
seeks to re-establish this value. As he rifles through the box of mementos, Travis describes what
he finds. His description of the last photo that he picks up is “a carte de visite of two young
ladies hand-in-hand in front of a painted field —” (678). Sarah immediately recognizes this
photo to be of herself and Henrietta, and she cries out: “Give that to me!” (678). Travis
relinquishes the photo, and “she instinctively tried and failed to unbutton the bosom of Mary’s
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dress [. . .]” (678). The dress will not easily unbutton, so Sarah “fling[s] herself over on the
mattress, away from Travis, covering the two faces with her body” (678). The best way she can,
Sarah wrests the sisters away from phallic interference and tries to reestablish nearness. Travis
calls “Mary…,” and in response Sarah says, “Can’t you leave me alone?” (678). On her request,
Travis leaves. His exit restores Sarah to Ireland and to Henrietta.
Sarah returns to the same autumn afternoon. The walk has ended, and the family has
returned to the house. Eugene, Henrietta, Sarah, Arthur and their mother sit together in the
drawing-room. Henrietta has turned away from Sarah. The narrator says of Henrietta, “Only by
never looking at Sarah did she admit their eternal loss” (679). Sarah notices the separation
between the two sisters, and, even more significant, she notices that Henrietta has given up on
embracing the difference of the feminine in its incommensurable form. Henrietta has become the
“-A,” absorbing and adopting the break-in. Of the two sisters, Henrietta was slightly more of an
alternative and subversive force. As the sisters walk in the field, the narrator explains that “Papa
[. . .] found Henrietta so hopelessly out of order that he took no notice of her” (673). It is a fit of
Henrietta’s uncontrollable laughter that causes the narrator to reveal this fact about Henrietta.
The narrator says that Henrietta “fairly suffered with laughter” (673). Sarah describes Henrietta’s
spirit as a “laughing shiver” that runs “into an element of its own” (679). And “Henrietta so
wholly and Sarah so nearly lost all human reason” when they ran around together in joyful “play
that was full of fear, fear that was full of play” (679) that when the two girls can be alone
together and near each other their activities fit the description of feminine jouissance. This
“play” causes the girls momentarily to “lose all human reason.” In those times, the girls shed
phallocentric logic or reason and lose their subjectivity in the excess of their joyful play. Now,
however, as the family sits in the drawing room, Henrietta “has locked” that possibility of play
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“inside her breast” by being “seated beside Mamma, in young imitation of Constance, the
Society daughter” (679). The otherness of Henrietta was critical to her and Sarah’s nearness to
the incommensurable feminine. Grosz writes that Irigaray uses “Derrida’s concept of difference
to clear a space in which women’s self-description in terms other than those which define men’s
self-sameness becomes possible” (104). Now, Henrietta’s physical proximity to Mamma and her
imitation of Constance reveal that she has given up her otherness to opt for a self-sameness that
supports the phallocentric project.
Sarah is feeling remorse and regret at Henrietta’s and her separation and at the loss of
Henrietta’s otherness. She surveys the drawing room, and she finds it just as produced and
“imaginary” as the fields. She takes note of the staging and the props: “[. . .] sofas, whatnots,
armchairs, occasional tables that all stood on tottering little feet [. . .] the towering vases upon the
consoles, the albums piled on the table, the shells and figurines on the flights of brackets” (680).
She observes that these things “all had, like the alabaster Leaning Tower of Pisa, an equilibrium
of their own. Nothing would fall or change. And everything in the drawing room was muted,
weighted, pivoted by Mamma” (680). The public space revolves around Papa—the man. This
private space is anchored by Mamma—the woman. All is as it should be in this proper Victorian
scene. But, again, Sarah reads that just below the surface of this scene, a second truth reveals
itself. These room embellishments teeter on little feet. Everything threatens to fall, but it will not,
not as long as Mamma keeps it anchored. Here, “Mamma” is woman, any woman, who is
plugged into the phallic economy and defined as “-A.” As long as woman continues to feed the
“theoretical machinery,” the wheels of the machine will stay greased and the production line will
continue. Before the break-in, Henrietta threatened to “jam” the machinery’s “pretension to the
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production of truth” (Irigaray, This Sex). Now, she mimics the Society daughter. Sarah is “in
anguish” (681), overcome at the horror of this loss.
Sarah seeks desperately to articulate this problem and speak a solution. The narrator
says, “However rash it might be to speak at all, Sarah wished she knew how to speak more
clearly. The obscurity and loneliness of her trouble was not to be borne. How could she put into
words the feeling of dislocation, the formless dread [. . .]?” (681). Through her postulation of the
incommensurable feminine, Grosz writes that Irigaray wishes to “enable other kinds of
philosophy to be spoken” (182). Sarah struggles with this goal, and she moves back and forth as
ghost in an attempt to achieve success at this articulation.
Irigaray writes, “And yet that woman-thing speaks. But not ‘like,’ not ‘the same,’ [. . .]
Not a ‘subject’” (This Sex 111). In the unconscious the incommensurable feminine speaks with
her own voice and lives on her own terms. Irigaray goes on to write, “Yet one must know how to
listen otherwise than in good form(s) to hear what it says” (This Sex 111). In the previous
sentence, Irigaray identifies the “it” as “that woman-thing” (111). Listening “otherwise than in
good form(s)” is to listen with the “bad form” of what Freud and Lacan, two European doctors,
arguably might have termed primitive people. This is not a difficult leap to make, since both
men termed the unconscious a “primal” and “primitive” state. Adopting the hearing of a
“primitive” unconscious will allow us to hear what it—the incommensurable feminine—says,
since she speaks in a foreign language outside of the accepted masculine order.
Henrietta’s response is neither thought nor language. It is action. Before leaving the
family, Eugene asks Henrietta not to let Sarah out of her sight until he returns the next day. He
attempts to possess Sarah and charges Henrietta with the task of protecting his possession.
Henrietta is offended. She cries: “She is never out of my sight. Who are you to ask me that, you
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Eugene? Whatever tries to come between me and Sarah becomes nothing. Yes, come tomorrow,
come sooner, come—when you like, but no one will ever be quite alone with Sarah” (683).
Later, as Travis shifts through the pictures and letters in the box, he reveals that very little
survives from Eugene’s life. What he does know is that a letter from Fitzgeorge states that a
friend of Fitzgeorge’s youth “was thrown from his horse and killed riding back after a visit to
their home” on a fine evening in autumn. Travis explains that “Fitzgeorge wonders, and says he
will always wonder, what made the horse shy in those empty fields” (685). This line is the last
line in the story. Eugene’s strange death after leaving the family on this evening is the fruition of
Henrietta’s prophecy that “whatever tries to come between me and Sarah becomes nothing”
(680). Henrietta recognizes the break-in that Eugene represents and foresees the damage it will
cause. Henrietta says to Eugene, accusingly, “It is you who is trying to make something bad
happen.” (683). After playing with the possibility of “-A,” she finally revolts against it. She must
kill Eugene and murder the phallic symbol to return to feminine autoerotism. Travis says, “From
all negative evidence, Sarah, like Henrietta, remained unmarried” (684). And, according to
Travis, she probably died young.
The story’s supernatural quality is heightened by Henrietta’s eerie prophecy and
Eugene’s unusual death. I argue that when placed in the context of Celtic mythology and
folklore, the death on horseback in the fields, Henrietta’s prophecy, and the rooks that are
prominently featured in the first half of the story further illuminate the idea that Bowen is
creating an alternate world where the female exists in terms incommensurable with the
masculinist world’s given articulations. In Celtic mythology Badb is the Celtic goddess of war.
She is one of the Tuatha Dé Danann or the People of the Goddess Danu. The Tuatha Dé Danann
are a well-known tribe in Celtic mytholgy. Badb often assumes the form of a raven or carrion-
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crow and is then referred to as Badb Catha, which translates as “battle raven.” Badb took part in
battles and influenced their outcome by causing confusion among the warriors with her magic.
The battle-field is often called “land of Badb.” In Celtic mythology, Badb often appears as part
of a trio along with Morrigan (whose name translates as “Phantom Queen” and who often
appears as a hooded crow) and either Macha (whose name also connotes “Crow”) or Nemain
(“Frenzy”). Together they are the goddesses of battle, strife, and fertility. In the first half of
THAF, the rooks (a common name for crow) are referenced three times. The three references to
rooks may nod to the three battle-goddesses. Moreover, Badb’s ability to cause confusion in
battles as well as influence their outcome speaks to Henrietta’s ability to cause a horse to shy in
an empty field. In The Great Queens, Rosalind Clark writes that the word Badb is a generic term
“signifying supernatural women, sometimes in the form of crows, who hover over the battlefield,
foretelling the slaughter and later feeding of the slain” (24). Henrietta predicts that Eugene will
“become nothing,” and the text creates a definite supernatural element connected to Eugene’s
strange death. Tapping into her mestiza’s consciousness, Bowen creates an alternate reality with
alternate rules and possibilities that allow for the supernatural to be commonplace. With the
mestiza consciousness, the fields become the “land of Badb”—a land that belongs to the women,
a land where men can become nothing.
In the end, Sarah is seeking a model that will maintain her autoerotic pleasure with her
sister and allow her to experience pleasure with Eugene. Of Henrietta and Eugene, Sarah says,
“[. . .] would they not without fail each grasp one of her hands?” (681). She desires both of them
to grasp her hands. She desires to be in a world where she does not have to choose A or B, where
she can have her male without losing her female, a world where she can have her female without
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losing her male. She seeks a world beyond A and B, where she is not forced to choose as her
only alternative to “be the subject or the object” (Irigaray, This Sex 78).
The story closes with a bomb that rocks Mary’s townhouse and almost kills Mary. At this
moment the possession of Mary by Sarah becomes less evident. However, I argue that Sarah
does not leave Mary altogether. I believe that Sarah weakens her hold on Mary and allows Mary
to return to her body but forces her to occupy her body as shared space. After the bomb, the
narrator says, “Remembering the box, Mary wondered if it had been buried again” (683). This is
not a brand-new voice, or the voice of someone who has returned to her body completely
unaware of the proceedings that have taken place over the course of the last two hours. This
“Mary” still desires a proximity with Sarah’s Victorian past.
But this Mary is not fully aware of what has taken place in the past two hours. “She
looked at her watch [. . .] she did not remember winding it for the last two days, but then she
could not remember much” (683). I argue that this hybrid Mary is both aware of the preceding
events and unaware of them because she is both Mary and Sarah. The next paragraph reads:
There being nothing left, she wished he would come to take her to the hotel. The one way
back to the fields was barred by Mary’s surviving the fall of ceiling. Sarah was right in
doubting that there would be tomorrow: Eugene, Henrietta were lost in time to the
woman weeping there on the bed, no longer reckoning who she was. (683)
This paragraph encapsulates Mary’s newly formed dual identity. This hybrid “she” wants Travis
to take her to the hotel. This she’s wish sounds like the wish of Mary, Travis’s lover. In addition
to knowing Mary’s mind, we know Sarah’s as well. Sarah is blocked from the fields because
Mary lived. She is trapped in Mary’s body, because Mary’s body was not destroyed. If Mary had
died, Mary would have lost her subjectivity. Mary’s loss would have provided Sarah with the
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gain of permanent sleep and a permanent return to Henrietta and Eugene in the fields. But Mary
lives. And Sarah remains living in her. Sarah has lost Henrietta and Eugene. She has lost them to
the woman weeping on the bed. Sarah has lost them because she is lost inside the woman
weeping on the bed. This woman no longer reckons who she is because this woman is no longer
just Mary or Sarah.
This new woman laments the cruelty of Sarah’s inability to reunite with Henrietta and
Eugene on that day. She says, “I have had a sister called Henrietta,” and later she says, abruptly
interrupting Travis, “And then there was Eugene” (684). This woman desires both the male and
the female. However, her abrupt and incoherent sentences are not a logical summation of events
or people; they are her attempts to grasp at the language and logic needed to put the events
together coherently. She is grasping at a language and a logic that will unite male and female.
She says, “What has happened is cruel: I am left with a fragment torn out of a day, a day I don’t
even know where or when; and now how am I to help laying that like a pattern against the poor
stuff of everything else?” (684). She cannot figure out how to put these pieces together. She
cannot make sense of it all. At the story’s close, neither Mary nor Sarah returns to her “rightful”
place. They merge together and form a new woman. This woman’s economy mimics the
economy that Irigaray describes:
Woman derives pleasure from what is so near that she cannot have it, nor have herself.
She herself enters into a ceaseless exchange of herself with the other without any
possibility of identifying either. This puts into question all prevailing economies: their
calculations are irremediably stymied by woman’s pleasure as it increases from its
passage in and through the other. (31)
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THAF begins with a case of possession, which is a form of complete and wholesale
ownership and which Irigaray attributes to the male. However, the story ends as a case of
nearness, not possession, which Irigaray attributes to the female. Whether Mary or Sarah will
eventually derive pleasure from this shared existence is unclear. But it is clear that they are so
close, sharing this same bodily space, that they cannot have their own selves or the other’s self.
They cannot have either. They will remain in this ceaseless exchange back and forth between the
two identities, yet living as one.
In addition to inhabiting Mary’s body, Sarah “warms up” to the idea of nearness with
Travis as well. She says, “I have missed you” (683). Travis, shocked by this change of tone,
responds, “Have you?” (683). Not being able to achieve nearness with Henrietta and Eugene,
Sarah settles on nearness with Mary and Travis. Sarah hopes to have Mary and Travis, reuniting
the three of them. Instead of restoring sense to the end of the story, this new woman remains
nonsense.
As the story closes, a mirror appears in this Bowen story, much like the mirror in “Green
Holly”:
She took the mirror out of her bag to see how dirty her face was. “Travis—” she
said suddenly.
“Mary?”
“Only, I—”
“That’s all right. Don’t let us imitate anything just at present.” (684)
The mirror that defines subjectivity appears again. As the woman looks at her face she is startled
“suddenly.” What does she see reflected in the mirror? What about herself causes her to react
suddenly? I argue that she fully realizes at this moment her shared existence. She knows that
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what is reflected back in the mirror is not the solid, well-grounded subject from before the
bombings. Travis’s response, with Mary’s name posed as a question, indicates that he, too, is not
completely sure who this new woman is. Her response to Travis is an attempt to articulate a
statement about herself, but she cannot. She fails in the phallic language of this world to
articulate this new self—this incommensurable feminine—because the language of the masculine
economy cannot describe what she is. That is exactly how it should be.

Conclusion
How do we talk about something that should be un-representable through
representational terms? How can one explore the world of ghosts without co-opting it with
language, which inserts ghosts into the phallic field? Winnubst writes that “The chains of linear
causality, teleology, univocity, individuality, rights and contracted power seem to be losing their
grip. And yet it often seems that those chains may work in the same way that a dog’s choke
collar works: the more we struggle, the tighter their grip” (13-14). I agree with Winnubst on this
point. For example, Althusser exposes how the mechanics of ideology interpellate the subject,
yet while showing how the subject is made, he announces that it cannot be escaped saying:
“There is no outside with respect to ideology” (1502). Lacan explains that there is a real, but all
of language exists in the realm of the symbolic. So how can anyone talk about the real? As I
mentioned earlier, my goal is to show how we can see the incommensurable feminine and
believe in her reality within a language that refuses to let anything be real. Otherwise, real
women will never access the radical possibilities she makes possible for them. We have to
exploit the incompleteness of language by embracing alternative ideas that make use of that
incompleteness in order to take their shape. As an Anglo-Irish woman plagued by a family
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history of insanity, Bowen was open to escaping the oppressive bounds of the subject. Those
who are othered are more likely to see a way out of the world that binds them. Russo provides a
Freudian example of her female grotesque. Russo says that Freud fills his case studies with
horrific dismemberments, distortions, hybridities, apparitions and uncanny doubles who contrast
with his “normal-looking” patients of bourgeois Vienna. (9). The apparitions, hybridities and
uncanny doubles sound a lot like the females from “Green Holly” and “The Happy Autumn
Fields.” These “hysterical” women of Vienna knew what these Bowen women know: that getting
out of the bounds of the real world provides access to the incommensurable feminine. Neither A
nor B, these women are not subjects of this world. Through the combination of a mestiza
consciousness and the feminine difference of Irigaray, one sees with double vision, and within
the chaos of a world of non-logic an apparition appears. She is the ghost—the incommensurable
feminine. Saying that ghosts are, making a statement that begins “the ghost is” is a non-sensical
statement. Nothing can be, and especially ghosts cannot be. So what does it mean when one says
that ghosts are? What becomes of our world when ghosts are what cannot be? The world comes
undone and the subject loses its subjectivity.
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